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Article
Toward a Better Competition Policy for the Media:
The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies that
Support the Media Sector's Unique Role in Our
Democracy
MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES

It is difficult to formulate meaningful competition policy when there is
a fierce debate over the current competitiveness of the media industry.
After addressing the importance of the marketplace of ideas in our
democracy, this Article examines the current state of the media industry,
including the response of traditional media to audience declines, the
growth of new media, the impact of media consolidation (including its
impact on minority and women ownership), and the role of the Internet.
In response to recent calls for liberalizing cross-ownership rules to
protect traditionalmedia, this Article outlines why conventional antitrust
policy is difficult to apply in media markets, and how the concerns
underlying media mergers differ from other industries. This Article
recommends first that Congress should take the lead in formulating a
nationalmedia policy; second, an agendafor the agencies to look beyond a
merger's impact on advertising rates and more empirical work on media
mergers' impact on the marketplace of ideas; and finally, ways the
government can promote access to the marketplace of ideas.
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Toward a Better Competition Policy for the Media:
The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies that
Support the Media Sector's Unique Role in Our
Democracy
MAURICE

E. STUCKE* & ALLEN P. GRUNESl

I. INTRODUCTION

Two concerns traditionally have been raised about large media
enterprises. First, media giants may raise prices to consumers and
advertisers above competitive levels. This concern about corporate market
power cuts across all industries. The second concern is media-specific:
namely, society's political and cultural health "is fostered by numerous,
independent media," and excessive media concentration may threaten the
public's access to important information or viewpoints.'
The Obama administration is confronting both concerns. In response
to declining audiences and advertising revenue, many traditional media
have laid off journalists and cut back on news. The daily newspaper has
been called an "endangered species" 2 with one prediction that "'more
newspapers and newspaper groups will default, be shut down and be
liquidated in 2009 and several cities could go without a daily print
What this means for antitrust policy is hotly
newspaper by 2010."''
contested.
Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law.
SParter, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP.
The authors, while at the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, investigated mergers
and anticompetitive restraints in the media industry. The authors would like to thank Albert A. Foer,
Matthew Gentzkow, Wolfgang Kerber, James Hamilton, Jeffrey Michael Hirsch, Robert H. Lande,
Jonathan Sallet, Bernard Sharfinan, Howard Shelanski, and Irwin Stelzer for their helpful comments.
An earlier version of this Article was part of the American Antitrust Institute's transition report for the
incoming Administration. AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE
AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE'S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/

transitionreport.ashx. The authors were the principal authors of a committee document that accepted
suggestions from, and was edited by, others at the AAI.
1William B. Shew & Irwin M. Stelzer, A Policy Framework for the Media Industries, in
MARKETS AND THE MEDIA: COMPETITION, REGULATION AND THE INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS 109, 111

(M.E. Beesley ed., 1996).
2 Kevin J. Martin, The Daily Show, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at AO; see also John Nichols &
Robert McChesney, The Death and Life of Great American Newspapers, NATION, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090406/nichols-mcchesney.
3Michael Hirschom, End Times, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2009, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/
200901/new-york-times.
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The financial setbacks of traditional media have led some to call for
further relaxation of media ownership restrictions. On March 17, 2009, for
example, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives asked the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ") to take a broader view of media
competition in the Bay Area. As the Hearst Corporation's San Francisco
Chronicle reported, "House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, worried about the fate
of The Chronicle and other financially struggling newspapers, urged the
Justice Department Monday to consider giving Bay Area papers more
'4
leeway to merge or consolidate business operations to stay afloat.
Thereafter, newspaper publishers and owners asked Congress to relax the
antitrust laws to allow newspapers to work together to develop new
business models.5 The acting chair of the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), Michael Copps, said that his agency may reconsider
the FCC restrictions on combined ownership of broadcast television
stations and newspapers.6 The FCC should "visit this whole problem
before long.",7 But in 2007 and 2008, Commissioner Copps vigorously
opposed relaxing the media cross-ownership rules, and advocated for
"tough" FCC rules "to redress our localism and diversity gaps.",8 In
dissenting when the FCC voted to relax these media cross-ownership
restrictions,
Commissioner Copps observed how the experts
"demonstrate[d]-in the record before the FCC, using the FCC's own
data-that cross-ownership leads to less total newsgathering in a local
market. And that has large and devastating effects on the diversity and
vitality of our civic dialogue." 9
Others favor media deregulation because the Internet has lowered entry
barriers and introduced new outlets. Nonetheless, most Americans
continue to get their news and information primarily from television and
newspapers, and traditional media companies own many of the most
popular Internet news sites. Critics of media consolidation have argued,
like FCC Commissioner Copps, that it has had a negative impact on quality
and choice. Moreover, they recognize that an emerging and increasingly
more competitive new media market does not warrant ignoring antitrust
4 Zachary Coile, Pelosi Goes to Bat to Keep Bay Area Newspapers Alive, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 17,
2009, at A8. For our response to the Speaker's concerns, see Maurice E. Stucke, ConcentratedMedia
is Something We Can 't Ignore: A Response to Speaker Pelosi, (Univ. of Tennessee Coll. of Law
Research Paper No. 58, May 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1369763.
5 Evan Hessel, Can a News Cabal Save Newspapers?, FORBES, May 11,
2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/08/newspapers-anti-trust-business-media-adcollusion.htmi.
6
Todd Shields, FCC Head Says Agency Should Reconsider Newspaper Ownership Rule,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
BLOOMBERG,
Mar. 26, 2009,
aYAdWOXUq9FA.
71Id.

8 Michael J. Copps, Comm'r of the FCC, Concurs and Dissents in Part to FCC Adopting Rules
Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services 1 (Dec. 18, 2007), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-279035A3.pdf.
9
1d. at 4.
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enforcement in major media formats.
Given President Obama's concerns about media consolidation,10 a
change in media policies is likely. But what form will such change take,
especially given that traditional media are in flux? It is difficult for the
Obama administration to formulate meaningful policy when there is a
fierce debate about whether a problem really exists. Thus, our principal
recommendation is to get a better grasp on the fundamental issues: Are
media industries becoming more concentrated or not? Where is the
audience going for its news? What weight should be given to alternatives
such as blogs? Have there been adverse effects from prior media mergers?
Have the predicted efficiencies occurred? Aside from price and output
concerns, what is the impact on the quality and diversity of viewpoints
when media outlets fall into the hands of fewer owners, and those owners
are less likely to include minority and women owners?
Part II of this Article addresses the importance of the marketplace of
ideas in our democracy. Part III examines the current state of the media
industry, including the response of traditional media to audience declines,
the growth of new media, the impact of media consolidation (including its
impact on minority and women ownership), and the role of the Internet.
Part IV responds to the calls for liberalization to protect traditional media.
We argue that media industries differ from other industries and one must
move beyond a laissez-faire attitude. Part V concludes with some
proposals for the Obama administration.

II. HOW A VIBRANT MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS PROMOTES DEMOCRACY
AND THE FREE MARKET

A competitive "marketplace of ideas"" plays an important role in our
democracy. Its beneficial social value is based on the theory that truth
prevails in the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources. 12 The best test of truth is the success of an idea
in gaining acceptance in free competition with other ideas. Just as
competition produces the best widget, so too competition in the
marketplace of ideas advances truth. Thus, democracy prospers when
there is an unrestrained flow of information. To govern themselves, the
1oSee Sen. Barack Obama & Sen. John F. Kerry, Media ConsolidationSilences Diverse Voices,
POLITICO, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/l107/6758.html
("[T]houghtful
exchange of diverse viewpoints not only helps guarantee our freedom as individuals, it ensures those in
power can be held accountable for all that they do.").
" The marketplace of ideas is "[a] sphere in which intangible values ... compete for acceptance."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1383 (1986); see Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market .... ).
12 See United States v. Assoc. Press (AP1), 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S.
I (API) (1945).
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electorate must have full access to "social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences ... ,,3 While to many this marketplace of
ideas "is, and always will be, folly," we, in our democracy, "have staked
upon it our all."' 4 An essential goal of the First Amendment is to promote
this marketplace of ideas by restricting to varying degrees governmental
restraints on speech, and achieving "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources....,"15
The question invariably arises whether the First Amendment restricts
the government's ability to regulate media ownership or, rather, supports
such an effort. Some media owners see attempts to limit ownership as
burdening their ability to speak to as many people as they can through the
acquisition of additional media.
This interpretation of the First
Amendment, supported by statements by the D.C. Circuit in Time Warner
16
Entertainment Co. v. FCC,
views the beneficiaries as corporations and
the First Amendment as a vehicle to keep government away from their
expressive freedom.
This argument that the government should not limit the rights of media
conglomerates depends on several assumptions. First, it assumes that laws
that regulate business conduct such as mergers are equivalent to laws that
prohibit specific communicative content, which is the defining feature of
censorship of speech. Second, it assures that the corporation is the ultimate
and proper beneficiary of press freedom. Third, it assumes that "structural
rules are appropriately evaluated under a heightened [level of] scrutiny.' 17
A better reading of the First Amendment, one more in tune with
Supreme Court precedent, is that "'the right of the viewers and listeners,"'
not the right of the owners, "'is paramount.""08 Mergers and acquisitions
may have a positive or negative effect from the consumer's standpoint.
Mergers may create a strong voice where none existed before; on the other
hand, they may reduce the number of voices and thus inhibit the robustness
of debate. In tandem with First Amendment principles, the federal
13Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).

14AP I, 52 F. Supp. at 372; see also Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and
the
Marketplace ofIdeas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 249 (2001).
' AP 1, 326 U.S. at 20.
16Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1128-29 (D.C. Cit. 2001).

17C. EDwIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS

127-29 (2007).
" Red Lion Broad.Co., 395 U.S. at 390. In AP II, Justice Black rejected AP's argument that it
should have the autonomy to control its own operations and its own associations with newspapers
without government interference: "The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against
application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary." AP II, 326 U.S. at 20.
That this is the proper interpretation may be seen from the fact that telephone companies, as common
carriers, must carry expressions that their owners would find objectionable, and from the widespread
requirements that both broadcasters and cable systems must carry content that they would reject.
Under this view, the application of antitrust laws is in tune with the First Amendment because "[the
First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public .. " Id.
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antitrust laws can promote the marketplace of ideas by reaching
anticompetitive private restraints on this marketplace.' 9 The Supreme
Court and lower courts have made this link explicit.20 "[A]s the Supreme
Court has recognized, in promoting diversity in sources of information,"
wrote Judge Greene in United States v. AT&T, "the values underlying the
FirstAmendment coincide with the policy of the antitrust laws., 21 Some
have argued that consideration of First Amendment values should persuade
antitrust officials to seek a higher than usual level of competition in media
markets.22
In promoting a competitive marketplace of ideas, competition
agencies, in turn, can promote the objectives of competition generally. An
independent and competitive media, for example, informs policy makers of
the unintended social effects of their policies, provides a voice to pressure
the government for change, serves as a catalyst for institutional change to
promote competition policy, increases political accountability, and reduces
corruption, which hampers any competition policy. 23 As Professor Ed
Baker writes:
Concentrated communicative power creates demagogic
dangers for a democracy, reduces the number of owners who
can choose to engage in watchdog roles, may reduce the
variety in perspectives among the smaller group of people
who hold ultimate power to choose specific (varying)
watchdog projects, and multiplies the probable conflicts of
interest that can muzzle these watchdogs.24

III. CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMPETITIVENESS
OF THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

Given the importance of a vibrant marketplace of ideas to our
democracy and free market system, the Obama administration is already
& Grunes, supra note 14, at 252.
See, e.g., FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18 (1978)
("[A]pplication of the antitrust laws to newspapers is not only consistent with, but is actually
supportive of the values underlying, the First Amendment."); Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 390
("[T]he purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by
the Government itself or a private licensee.").
21 United States v. AT&T Co. 552 F. Supp. 131, 184 (D.D.C. 1982) (emphasis added).
22 See, e.g., Wilfred Rumble, The FCC's Reliance on Market Incentives to Provide Diverse
19Stucke
20

Viewpoints on Issues of Public Importance Violates the First Amendment Right to Receive Critical
Information, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 793, 794-95 (1994). For a general review of such arguments, see I
FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION 22 (Dec.

14-15, 1978) (remarks of Professor Monroe Price, UCLA Law School).
23For a discussion how an independent competitive media can advance the goals of competition
policy, see Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 951, 1020-25
(2008).
24 BAKER, supra note 17, at 120-21.

CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42: 101

engulfed in the ongoing debate over the health and competitiveness of the
U.S. news media. 25
This section first examines the health and
competitiveness of traditional media, given its reduction of journalists and
output. After looking at the growth of new media, this section next
examines the impact of media consolidation on the marketplace of ideas
generally, and on women and minority ownership of the media in
particular.
A. Health and Competitiveness of TraditionalMedia
The media industry is in flux.
In recent years, some media
conglomerates have shed,26 while others have increased, their holdings.27
25 Senator

Kohl summarized the concerns that media consolidation has on the marketplace of

ideas:
It's such a very important issue, media consolidation, because it has the potential
to reduce if not eliminate the opportunities people have to read and think about
differing opinions and independent opinions. If this were to happen, it would have a
devastating impact on our society and our democracy. So I believe both the FCC
and the antitrust enforcement agencies, and our Antitrust Subcommittee, all have an
important role to play in addressing this issue... . We need to be very much on
guard to see to it that media consolidation doesn't happen to the extent that we have
a society where the Fourth Estate has lost its spontaneity, its vigor, and its ability to
encourage debate and to get people thinking. It's so important to our democracy.
Multiplicity of independent ownership and vigorous competition is what is essential.
If we have just a few companies that control vast portions of the media, I cannot
imagine how that's in the interest of anyone, except of course media owners who
would profit greatly. In sum, I believe it is very important that we in governmentincluding here in Congress and in the antitrust enforcement agencies too-stand in
the way of excessive media consolidation. And I understand that this may make
some people in the private sector upset because they think maybe you're going too
far. But if you gave me the choice of going too far and not going far enough, in the
effort to keep the media as independent and competitive as we can, I'd rather go too
far than not go far enough.
ANTITRUST: So it sounds like you believe that this issue of preserving
diversity of viewpoint should be a part-perhaps a big part-of the antitrust review.
SENATOR KOHL: Yes, very much so. I strongly believe that antitrust
enforcement agencies should be aware of, and consider, the likely effects on
diversity and the marketplace of ideas when they review a media merger.
Larry Fullerton & Mark Whitener, Interview with US. SenatorHerb Kohl [D-Wi], Chairman,Antitrust
Subcommittee, 21 ANTITRUST 7, 12 (2007).
26 In 2005, Viacom split into two separate companies: Viacom and CBS Corporation.
In 2006,
Clear Channel Communications and CBS, the largest and second largest radio holders, announced
plans to sell some of their radio and television stations. Clear Channel announced selling 448 "noncore" radio stations, all in markets outside the top 100, and its entire television station group, which
collectively contributed less than ten percent of the company's 2005 revenues. Press Release, Clear
Channel Announces Plan to Sell Radio Stations Outside the Top 100 Markets and Entire Television
Station Group (Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.
aspx?PressReleaselD=1825. In 2007, Clear Channel sold 217 non-core radio stations and reached
definitive purchase agreements to sell twenty-eight more "non-core" radio stations. CLEAR CHANNEL
CORP., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 4 (Dec. 31, 2007), available at http://www.clearchannel.
com/nvestors/Documents/291.pdf. In 2008, Clear Channel completed the planned divestiture of its
non-core radio stations and the sale of its television business. CLEAR CHANNEL CORP., ANNUAL
REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.clearchannel.comlnvestors/
Documents/320.pdf. Today, according to its website, Clear Channel operates "over 800 radio stations
reaching more than 110 million listeners every week across all 50 states."
Clear Channel
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And traditional media companies have expanded their Internet holdings or
sought to collaborate with well-known Internet companies.28
Many traditional news media are losing their audience. Daily
newspapers and alternative newsweeklies have lost circulation for their
print editions 29 as their readership ages. 30 In recent years, ratings for cable
and network national news and local televised news have declined.3 ' For
the three traditional networks' evening newscasts, the number of viewers
in 2006 was half its 1980 level, with the median age of the networks'
Communications,
Inc.,
Fact
Sheet,
http://clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?
PressReleaselD=l 564&p=hidden (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). After 2005, CBS sold eleven television
and over forty radio stations in medium and smaller-markets. John Eggerton, CBS Sells Four Stations
to Four Points Media, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6521802.html.
By the end of 2008, CBS owned thirty
broadcast TV stations and 137 radio stations. CBS CORP., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at I-1, 1-2
(Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.cbscorporation.com/investors/formlOk/2008_10--pdf. In
2007, Walt Disney Co. sold twenty-two big-city radio stations to Citadel for approximately $2.7
billion. Citadel's entire stock-market value dropped in 2008 to under $300 million, which is a fraction
of the value for its purchase of the Disney radio stations completed eight months earlier. Paul Farhi,
Strapped Owner Fires WMAL Host Chris Core, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2008, at CO. On May 7, 2007,
The New York Times Company sold its Broadcast Media Group, consisting of nine network-affiliated
television stations, their related Web sites and the digital operating center, to Oak Hill Capital Partners,
for approximately $575 million. THE NEW YORK TIMES Co., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at P.IP.2 (Feb. 26, 2008), availableat http://www.nytco.com/investors/financials/annualreports 2007.html.
27 In 2007, News Corporation, which has major holdings in filmed entertainment, television, cable
network programming, direct broadcast satellite television, magazines, newspapers, and book
publishing, acquired the Dow Jones & Company, Inc. for approximately $5.6 billion. Paul R.
LaMonica, News Corp. Wins Fightfor Dow Jones, CNNMoNEY, July 31, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/
2007/07/31/news/companies/dowjones-newscorp/index.htm. Rivals Sirius Satellite Radio and XM
Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. merged, unopposed by the DOJ. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of
XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.'s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc. 1 (Mar. 24, 2008), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press releases/2008/231467.pdf. The FCC also approved the
merger with minor conditions, even though earlier when the FCC auctioned the only two satellite
digital audio radio service licenses, it specifically prohibited one company from owning both licenses.
Cheryl Bolen, XM, Sirius Accept Consent Decree to Secure FCC Approval of Merger, ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. DAILY (BNA) (July 25, 2008).

28 Project for Excellence in Journalism, Network TV, in THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2008
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 PEJ Report], available at http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/2008/index.
php.
29Between 1950 and 2008, the circulation and number of United States daily newspapers have
declined from 1772 newspapers with a collective daily circulation of 53,829,000 to 1408 newspapers
with a collective daily circulation of 48,597,000. NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, THE

SOURCE-NEWSPAPERS BY THE NUMBERS (2009), available at http://www.naa.org/TrendsandNumbers/

Total-Paid-Circulation.aspx. This decline is attributable to evening newspapers; the number of
morning newspapers (some of which are former afternoon newspapers) increased from 322 newspapers
with a collective circulation over twenty-four million to 872 morning newspapers with a daily
circulation over forty-two million. Id.
30 See Newspapers, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28 (stating that in 2007, 33% of 18-to-24 year
olds and 34% of 25-to-34 year olds read a newspaper in an average week).
31Overview, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28. The average audience for the three main cable
news channels declined in 2006. Project for Excellence in Journalism, Cable TV, in THE STATE OF THE
NEWS MEDIA 2007 (2007), available at http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2007/index.asp [hereinafter
2007 PEJ Report].

In 2007, viewership increased by about three percent, but viewership overall is

below levels from the early 2000s. Cable TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supranote 28.
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nightly news viewers at sixty years.32 Between 1998 and 2006, the
commercial radio audience declined as wel133-a notable exception,
National Public Radio, had an increase in listeners.34 Americans have a
less favorable view of the press, partly due to the perception of greater
bias. 35 Although traditional media have attracted new readers to their
websites, their online revenues have been unable to support their news
operations.3 6 Newspaper advertising revenue declined 7.9% in 2007 and
16.6% in 2008. 37 Consequently, even The New York Times Company,
with its popular online news website (which attracted twenty million
unique users for the month of October 2008, making it the fifth-ranked
news site on the Internet in terms of total visitors), faced the prospect of
defaulting on some
$400 million in debt, leading some to question its
38
future viability.
B. TraditionalMedia'sReduction in Output
With print circulation, viewership, and advertising revenue declining,
traditional media companies-the large broadcasters, newspaper and
magazine publishers-generally have responded to these audience declines
by reducing costs. Some cost savings may be a result of efficiencies such
as back office savings, a move to cheaper delivery alternatives, or
outsourcing certain functions. Many major media companies, however,
32

Network TV, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 31. In 2007, viewership experienced a steeper
decline of five percent or 1.2 million fewer viewers, and the median age of nightly news viewers
increased to sixty-one years old. Network TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supranote 28.
33The average number of radio listeners per quarter hour, based on Arbitron, has fallen 6.6%:
from approximately 19.7 million to approximately 18.4 million. GEORGE WILLIAMS, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY 2007, 14-15, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A l.pdf. The author of the report
noted that further analysis was necessary to test whether there was a causal link between industry
consolidation and this decline in listenership. Alternative explanations could include the availability of
alternative
products, such as satellite radio, Internet radio, and downloading of digital music. Id. at 15.
34
Radio, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 31.
35 Overview, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 31. A recent national poll found significantly
declining percentages of Americans saying they believe all or most of media news reporting. Just
19.6% of those surveyed could say they believe all or most news media reporting, down from 27.4% in
2003. Sacred Heart University, Americans Slam News Media on Believability, SACRED HEART UNIV.
NEWS, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.sacredheart.edu/pages/20786_americansslamnewsmedia-on
believability.cfn.
36 Overview, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28.
37
Richard Prez-Pefia, Newspaper Ad Revenue CouldFallas Much as 30%, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2009, at BO.
38 Hirschom, supra note 3. In 2008, the Times's newspaper advertising revenue declined 14.2%.
Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Times Co. Suspends its Dividendto Raise Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at B6.
To meet its significant debt payments, the Times in 2009 suspended dividends for the first time in four
decades as a publicly traded company, borrowed $250 million from a Mexican billionaire, and is
seeking to sell its interest in the Boston Red Sox and to arrange a sale-leaseback of a portion of its
head-quarters building. Id. The Times lost $74.5 million in the first three months of 2009, and in its
negotiations with The Boston Globe's unions threatened to close that newspaper. Clark Hoyt, When
Your Sister Is the Story, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2009, at 8.
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continue to lay off journalists, 3 9 close news bureaus here4 ° and abroad,4 1
cut back on news coverage, and offer more "hit-and-run" and less
investigative journalism.42 Radio stations carry less local news.43 Local
television stations increased the production of news, but without
significantly adding journalists, leading to less original reporting and
greater reliance on non-original material 44 or sharing news with rival

39Between 2000 and 2006, newsroom staffing at daily newspapers declined by 3000 or about five
percent, with greater layoffs expected. From 2002 to 2006, news division staffing on the network
televisions dropped about ten percent. Layoffs at the major news magazines (such as Time and U.S.
News & World Report) and network news programs had even greater percentages. Overview, in 2008
PEJ Report, supra note 28. In contrast, newsroom staffing is increasing for local television news and
the ethnic newspapers. Id.; see also DAvID H. WEAVER ET AL., THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST IN THE

21ST CENTURY: U.S. NEWS PEOPLE AT THE DAWN OF A NEW MILLENNIUM 1-2 (2007) (noting a
decline of approximately 6000 full-time people or five percent working in the news between June 1992
and November 2002). The number of total newspaper employment, which increased between 1970 and
1990, has declined annually thereafter. NEWSPAPER ASS'N OF AMERICA, FACTS ABOUT NEWSPAPERS

2004, availableat http://www.naa.org/info/facts04/employment.html (providing data for 1970-2003).
40Stephen Foley, The Writing's on the Wall for the Old-Style American Newspaper, INDEP., Dec.
15, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/the-writings-on-the-wall-for-the-oldstyleamerican-newspaper-1066695.html. As newspapers seek to cut costs further, for example, "more and
more of them come to view Washington bureaus as luxuries they simply cannot afford" and "have
eliminated more than 40 Washington regional reporter positions through layoffs, buyouts or attrition."
Jennifer Dorroh, EndangeredSpecies: Many Newspapers are Laying off the Reporters Who Monitor
the Federal Government from a Local Angle, AM. JOURNALISM REV. (Dec./Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4645.
41Newspapers, in 2008 PEJ Report, supranote 28.
42One study of news coverage in forty-eight media outlets and five media sectors found a number
of stories "that were big events that flashed across the media landscape and then vanished almost
instantly, with less follow-up than one might have expected." Overview, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra
note 28; see also Eric Alterman, The News Business: Out of Print,NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 48.
The major broadcast news networks, for example, have reduced staffing, halved the number of overseas
news bureaus, and aired forty-six percent fewer foreign stories since the late 1980s. Network TV, in
2007 PEJ Report, supra note 31. Moreover, the historic 22 minutes of news in a 30-minute evening
network news broadcast had shrunk by 2007 to an average of 18.6 minutes (ABC had an average of
18.1 minutes of news per night; CBS had 18.7 minutes; and NBC had 18.8 minutes). Network TV, in
2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28. As one newspaper industry analyst commented, rather than
innovating, "most newspaper companies concentrated on shoring up the profitability of their traditional
newsprint-oriented business, chiefly through laying off employees, downsizing their newspapers and
cutting back on circulation in distant areas of little interest to advertisers in their core markets." John
Morton, Buffeted: Newspapers are Paying the Pricefor Shortsighted Thinking, AM. JOURNALISM REV.
(Oct./Nov. 2007), availableat http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4416.
43In 2006, radio stations on average aired each day 37.1 minutes of locally produced news, of
which 20.2 minutes was aired during the morning drive. Bob Papper, By the Numbers: News, Staffing
and Profitability Survey, COMMUNICATOR, Oct. 2006, at 34, available at http://www.rtnda.org/
media/pdfs/communicator/2006/oct/102006-22-34.pdf. As the article notes:
There's little positive news on the radio side. Both the average amount of news
and average staff size fell from a year ago. While consolidation makes it difficult to
track radio news over time, it's clear that the overall trend is down. The typical
radio news director oversees three to four stations, and more than three-quarters of
radio news directors also have non-news responsibilities.
Id. at 22.
" Local TV, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 31; Copps, supra note 8, at 6 ("We have witnessed
the number of statehouse and city hall reporters declining decade after decade, despite an explosion in
state and local lobbying.").
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stations. 45 One weekly news magazine in 2008 went monthly.46 With the
recent financial crisis, more newspapers are expected to cut home
48 migrate from print to
delivery,4 7 reduce the number of days they publish,
49 or shut down entirely.5 0
online-only editions,
Although their profit margins have shrunk, many daily newspapers and
television stations remain profitable, indeed, more profitable than other
industries. 5' This has led skeptics to dispute the claim that newspapers and
4s One estimate is that 200 local television stations get news from other news stations, and thirtyseven percent of surveyed local news directors said in 2006 that they shared content with other local
television stations. Local TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28. For non-affiliated commercial
television stations, fifty percent of the news directors said they shared content in 2006, compared to
none the year before. Id.; see also Some News-sharing Alliances that Emergedin 2008, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 5, 2009; Staci D. Kramer, Washington Post, Baltimore Sun Will Share Some Sports,
Maryland Coverage, PAID CONTENT, Dec. 23, 2008, http://paidcontent.org/article/419-washingtonpost-baltimore-sun-will-share-some-news/.
46 Richard Prez-Pefla, US. News Will Become a Monthly Magazine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008,
at B3.
47 The Albuquerque Journal,New Mexico's largest daily newspaper, announced in 2009 it was
stopping home deliveries and rack sales in more than thirty communities around the state because of
the economic downturn, leaving readers with online or mail delivery. This follows the Detroit Free
Press and DetroitNews, which in 2008, limited home delivery to three days a week (Thursday, Friday,
and Sunday), and the San Antonio (Texas) Express-News, which stopped home delivery and singlecopy sales in parts of South Texas. See Sue Major Holmes, Albuquerque Journal to Halt Some Home
Deliveries, ALLBuSINESS, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.allbusiness.com/nmarketing-advertising/marketingadvertising-channels/l 1928025-I .html; Dramatic Changes Unveiled at the News, Free Press,DETROIT
NEWS, Dec. 17,2008.
48 Richard Pirez-Pefia, 4 Michigan Markets Will Lose Daily Newspapers, as Ailing Industry Tries
to Cope, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at B8 (noting that three former daily Michigan newspapers are
now publishing only three days per week).
49 See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, Christian Science Paper to End Daily Print Copies, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 2008, at B8 (stating that the ChristianScience Monitor will appear online instead of in weekly
print). In January 2009, Hearst announced that it was putting the Seattle Post-Intelligencer(and its
interest in a joint operating agreement with the Seattle Times) up for sale, with the expectation that if no
buyer was found within sixty days the paper would either become a web-only operation or cease
publishing entirely.
Dan Richman & Andrea James, For Sale: The P-I, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Jan. 9, 2009, at Al. No buyer was found, and the P-I ceased producing a print edition.
Dan Richman & Andrea James, Seattle P-I to Publish Last Edition Tuesday, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Mar. 16, 2009, at News-W. Advance Publications replaced its 174-year-old Ann
Arbor News with primarily a Web-based operation. Prez-Pefla, supra note 48.
50For example, in early 2009, E.W. Scripps Co. closed its newspaper, the Rocky Mountain News.
Paul Beebe, Are Newspapers Sinking?, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 15, 2009.
SI As one newspaper industry analyst wrote:
Bad as 2007 has been, the publicly reporting companies still produced an average
operating-profit margin of nearly 16 percent in the first half of the year--a level
many businesses can never hope to achieve. Still, the average profit margin has
been in steady decline since 2002, when it was 22.3 percent.
Morton, supra note 42. That same analyst in reviewing the financials of publicly held newspapers
through September 2008 noted that despite a nearly 40% decline in operating profits, the operating
profit margins, subject to certain adjustments, were 11.3%. John Morton, It Could Be Worse, AM.
JOURNALISM REv. (Dec.IJan. 2009), available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id-4660; see also
Newspapers, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28 (newspaper industry's pre-tax margin was
approximately 18.5% in 2007); Copps, supra note 8 ("We shed crocodile tears for the financial plight
of newspapers-yet the truth is that newspaper profits are about double the S&P 500 average.").
Likewise, the president of a station brokerage business said that:
Wall Street has walked away from broadcast investments because they don't see
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other traditional media are going the way of the buggy whip. Nonetheless,
even before the recent recession, many publicly-traded media companies,
despite double-digit profit margins, lost favor on Wall Street. 2 Some
companies saddled by debt from recent acquisitions had a tougher time
meeting their debt obligation during this recession, notably the Tribune
Company, Philadelphia Newspapers, and Star Tribune of Minneapolis,
which entered bankruptcy. 53 In this current recession, media companies'
advertising revenues and profits are expected to deteriorate further.
C. Growth of New Media
Today, consumers can access news and entertainment from personal
digital audio and video devices (such as iPods, WiFi, mobile phones,
WiMAX, and mp3 players), subscriber-based satellite digital radio service
(with numerous niche formats), direct broadcast satellite systems, Internet
content providers, and HD Radio (multi-channel, multi-format digital radio
services). The number of media outlets has multiplied. 4 With such
technological innovations, consumers often can select the content they
want, when and where they want it, from a variety of sources. Journalism
is no longer passively consumed. Consumers can create news and
participate in the news discourse through citizen publishing, blogging,
YouTube, and other developments. The number of web sites run by citizen
the growth that the industry has had over the past 20-30 years..
.. Growth has
slowed, but broadcasting is a tremendously high free-cash-flow business. . . . A
television company has 35/--40% operating margin. You can't put your money in
anything else that gets that kind of return.
Paige Albiniak, Private Property: Broadcasting Moves Away from Wall Street, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Apr. 16, 2007, available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6433752.html; see
also Felicity Barringer, Fearof Cutbacks Rattles Papersin Philadelphia,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at
Cl (noting the doubling profit margins of two Philadelphia papers). Also local TV newsrooms,
according to one survey, contribute on average forty-two percent to a local television station's
revenues. Local TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supranote 28.
52Independent, publicly traded U.S. newspapers lost forty-two percent of their market value
between 2005 and 2008. Alterman, supra note 42, at 48; Newspapers, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note
28. With the dismantling of the second largest newspaper chain, Knight-Ridder, and radio giant Clear
Channel Communications going private, another debate is the optimal corporate model for ownership,
whether it be public, privately held, or non-profit trust. Overview, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 31.
By the end of 2008, approximately thirty U.S. newspapers were still up for sale. Kenneth Li,
Newspaper Asset Sales Draw Few Buyers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008. In contrast, stock prices of
publicly-traded television owners, as of mid-2007, had two to three times the growth of the overall
stock market. Local TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28.
53Morton, supra note 42; Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Bankruptcy ProtectionFiling at Minneapolis Star
Tribune, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at B3.
5 In the Matter of 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review, 23 F.C.C.R. 2010, 2015, 2042 (2008)
[hereinafter 2008 FCC Report]. The FCC noted in "absolute terms, dramatic changes have occurred
over several decades with respect to the number and types of media 'voices' competing for the public's
attention." Id. at 2024. The FCC noted the "hundreds of video programming channels available over
cable and, later, by satellite distribution," approximately 11.6 million subscribers to satellite radio,
approximately eighty-six percent of U.S. households subscribe to video service provided by an MVPD,
which includes cable, SMATV systems, direct broadcast satellite ("DBS"), fiberoptic network service,
wireless cable, and other such delivery systems. Id.
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journalists, according to one estimate, is approaching 1500. 55 "Eighty
percent of Internet users age 17 and older," according to a 2007 study,
"consider the Internet to be an important source of information for themup from 66 percent in 2006-and higher than television (68 percent), radio
(63 percent), and newspapers (63 percent). 5 6 And entry barriers are lower
with the Internet.
But despite its increasing prominence as a place where people access
news and advertisers spend money, the Internet remains a distribution
medium, not a source of original news content. Although Internet
companies invest in this medium, the investment has tended to be in
technology and not in journalists.
Internet sites unaffiliated with
traditional media typically collect stories from various newspapers and
wire services, or comment on the news, but do little original local news
coverage or investigative reporting. For example, three of the five most
popular news sites on the Web, according to one 2007 study, generated
sparse original reporting: both Yahoo and AOL relied on wire services and
other news outlets for ninety-nine percent and ninety-eight percent,
respectively, of their lead news services. Google relied exclusively on
news wires or other news outlets.5 7 Anecdotes exist of bloggers breaking a
news story, but the available survey data "suggest most Americans have
yet to accept them as significant news sources." 58 The most popular
Internet sites for news remain the domain of the largest media
conglomerates. 59 Of the twenty most popular online news sites, seventeen
are owned by one of the 100 largest media accompanies. 60 Time Warner,
the leading U.S. media company in advertising revenues between 1995
and 2008, for example, controls two (AOL News and CNN) of the four
most popular news websites. 6 1 Moreover, consumers spend on average six
minutes online per day reading the news.62 This (as other studies show)
suggests that online news currently complements, rather than replaces,
5s Online, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28.
56 Press

Release, USC Annenberg School for Communication, Annual Internet Survey by USC

Annenberg's Center for the Digital Future Finds Shifting Trends Among Adults About the Benefits and
Consequences of Children Going Online (Jan. 17, 2008), available at http://annenberg.usc.edu/
AboutUs/PublicAffairs/AbergNews/080117CDFsurvey.aspx.
17 Online, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28.
58Id.

59Online, in 2007 PEJ Report, supranote 31. The 100 largest media companies (in terms of 2005
revenues) owned sixteen of the top twenty popular online news sites, as ranked by Nielsen/Net Ratings.
Id.
60 Online, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28.
61 Id. Time Warner lost the top spot in 2009 to Comcast Corporation. Bradley Johnson, U.S.
Media Revenue Set for Historic 2009 Decline, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 5, 2009, available at
http://adage.com/mediaworks/article?articleid= 139445.
62Online, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 31. In contrast, surveyed consumers spent thirty
minutes watching TV news, fifteen minutes reading a newspaper, and sixteen minutes listening to news
on the radio. Id.
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traditional news media.63
Moreover, it is unclear whether the Internet will be sufficiently
profitable to invest in local investigative journalism. Approximately
eighty-five percent of all online advertising dollars goes to four Internet
sites (Google, Yahoo, AOL, and MSN), and all but one percent goes to the
top ten Internet sites. 64 As the financial failure of the citizen journalism
website, Backfence, reveals, "few of the estimated 500 or so 'local-local'
news sites claim to show a profit . . . the overwhelming majority lose
money," and the citizen journalism "business models remain deeply
uncertain." 65 Although the citizen journalists surveyed were quite upbeat,66
one pessimistic conclusion is that news reporting itself is at risk because of
the shift of audiences and advertisers to the Internet: "' [T]he economic
base supporting
the most difficult and expensive journalistic undertakings
67
is eroding."
New technologies are bringing dynamic innovations, but the available
evidence still points to the continuing importance of traditional media,
especially newspapers and broadcast television, to the marketplace of
ideas. In the same survey where users identified the Internet's increased
importance as an information source:
[O]nly small numbers of users believe that the Internet is a
catalyst for political change: less than one-quarter of users
(22 percent) believe that the Internet is a tool to encourage
public officials to care more about what people think, while
only 28 percent agree that using the Internet
gives people
68
more of a say in what government does.
The workhorse for gathering the news and investigating stories, as the FCC
recently found from its available data, remains the local daily newspaper,
followed by the local television station. 69 The record before the FCC
demonstrated that "traditional media still represent the most important
63

id,

64 Online, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28.
61Paul Farhi, Rolling the Dice, AM. JOURNALISM

REv. (June/July 2007), available at
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4343 (quoting a survey by J-Lab: The Institute for Interactive
Journalism).
6 Fifty-one percent said they didn't need to make money to keep going; 82% said they planned to
continue "indefinitely;" 73% called their sites a "success," based largely on the impact in their
communities; 82% said they provided opportunities for dialogue; 61% said they watchdogged local
government; 39% said they helped the community solve problems; 27% said they increased voter
turnout; and 17% said they increased the number of candidates running for office. Press Release, JLab: The Institute for Interactive Journalism, CitMedia Sites are Here to Stay (Feb. 5, 2007), available
at http://www.j-lab.org/about/press releases/citmedia sites are here to stay/.
67 BAKER, supra note 17, at 117 (quoting the Project for Excellence in Journalism).
" Press Release, USC Annenberg School for Communication, supra note 56.
692008 FCC Report, supra note 54, at 2030. Newspapers and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
broadcast stations still continue to serve as the most organized, systematic gatherers of news and
information in their communities.
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source for local news for the majority of individuals." A Nielsen Survey
indicated that 38.2% of all respondents consider broadcast television
stations and 30.1% consider local newspapers "the most important source
of local news or local current affairs."
Thus, the FCC categorized
"major" media voices "full-power commercial and noncommercial
television stations and major newspapers" because "such sources are
generally the most important and relevant outlets for news and information
in local markets today., 71 Newspapers and network television, found
another recent study, offer a wider variety of subject matter and are less
likely to be dominated by a few mega-stories.72 The Internet may provide
readers with more perspectives for international or national news, but is
not necessarily a close substitute for the local news in the local daily
newspaper and on the local television news broadcast. Cable provides
mainly national news;74 commercial radio covers little local news.
D. The Impact of Media Consolidation
Market failure in media industries poses different and greater concerns
than in other industries. With many commodities, market failure manifests
in higher prices. The consumer pays more. But market failure in the
marketplace of ideas may not manifest itself simply with higher prices.
Newspapers and other types of information-heavy media are what
economists refer to as "credence goods., 75 Their actual quality is difficult
to determine in isolation even after being purchased and consumed; it must
be taken to some degree on faith.76 A news channel may claim to be "fair
70

Id.at 2042.
Id.; see also Overview, in 2008 PEJ Report, supranote 28.
I'

72 Overview, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28.
71Online, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28 (basing statements on a 2007 study of lead news

coverage on the five most popular news sites on the Web).
74A study of 885 hours of cable news over 2007 found that cable news focused on three to four
topics per day, and on the news wires and "brief 'tell stories' for the balance. Cable TV,in 2008 PEJ
Report, supra note 28. MSNBC spent more time on politics (28% of time surveyed) than Fox News
(15%) or CNN (12%); Fox spent less time on the Iraq war (10% versus 18% on MSNBC and 16% on
CNN), and more time on crime, celebrity, and the media (28% versus 19% on MSNBC and 16% on
CNN). Id. PEJ calculated that if one watched five hours of cable news in 2007, one saw on average:
thirty-five minutes about campaigns and elections, thirty-six minutes about the debate over U.S. foreign
policy, twenty-six minutes or more of crime, twelve minutes of accidents and disasters, ten minutes of
celebrity and entertainment, and less than four minutes about health and health care (3:46); the
economy (3:34), environment (1:25), education (1:22), and science and technology (1:00). Id.
" See Neil W. Averit & Robert H. Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust
Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 207 (2007); Michael R. Darby & Edi Kami, Free Competition and the
Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973) ("Credence qualities are those which,
although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use. Instead the assessment of their value requires
additional costly information .... The line between experience and credence qualities of a good may
not always be sharp, particularly if the quality will be discerned in use, but only after the lapse of a
considerable
period of time.").
76
BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, UNCERTAIN GUARDIANS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A POLITICAL

INSTITUTION 101-02 (1999).
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and balanced" or "the most trusted name in news," but consumers may be
ill-equipped to ascertain the veracity of these assertions regarding specific
stories. Thus, competition allows "consumers to judge quality more
accurately because they can benchmark one firm's reporting against the
77
other.
Less competition thus may diminish the quality of reporting. For
example, during the 2008 presidential campaign, then Senator Obama
made extended critical comments about the current state of U.S. antitrust
policy in response to a question at a campaign stop in Oregon. He stated
that he intended, if elected, to enforce the antitrust laws more strongly and
singled out media consolidation as a particular cause for concern. The
Senator's comments came when there was significant debate about media
consolidation in light of the current FCC's relaxing of cross-ownership
rules and the DOJ's approval of the Sirius-XM satellite radio merger.
While Senator Obama's comments prompted an opinion piece from The
Nation and a brief mention in the Financial Times, none of the twenty
prominent newspapers surveyed by the American Antitrust Institute
("AAI") independently reported the comments. The Washington Post's
website and The New York Times's website carried a different Reuters
article that covered the reaction of the U.S. legal community to Senator
Obama's comments on antitrust policy without mentioning Senator
Obama's concerns of media consolidation.7 8 Likewise, as gasoline prices
escalated during the 2008 presidential election, so too did the debate over
drilling in environmentally sensitive areas. But there was no empirical
basis that such drilling would significantly affect gas prices. Instead, the
U.S. Department of Energy projected that such drilling (which was
estimated to add 200,000 barrels of oil per day at peak productions in
twenty years) would be too small to significantly affect oil prices. Of the
267 surveyed television and cable news broadcasts in the summer of 2008
that mentioned the proposed drilling, however, only one broadcast
mentioned this governmental study. Instead, as one study found, the major
"media outlets provided daily repetition of the false claim that expanded
drilling in environmentally sensitive zones would significantly lower
gasoline prices. 79
Another market failure unique to the media is self-censorship. 0
77Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Competition and Truth in the Market for
News, 22 J.
ECON. PERSP. 133, 142 (2008) [hereinafter Gentzkow & Shapiro, Marketfor News].
78Press Release, American Antitrust Inst. Notes, Comments by Senator Obama on Media

Concentration: Institute is Critical of Lack of Coverage by Mainstream Press, The American Antitrust
Inst. (May 22, 2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/AAI%2OPress%20

Release%200bama%20Media%20Consolidation%205.22.08

052220081804.pdf.

79Mark Weisbrot & Nichole Szembrot, Oil Drillingin Environmentally Sensitive Areas:
The Role

of the Media 2-4 (Center for Econ. & Policy Research Issue Brief Sept. 2008), available at

http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/media

drilling_2008_09.pdf.

80See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 17, at 40-41 (stating that pressures to please media advertisers
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Journalists and media watchdogs have expressed concern about the rise of
self-censorship and the loss of journalistic independence following the
increasing media concentration.8 ' Likewise, in enacting the 1992 Cable
Act, Congress noted its "special concerns" about concentration of the
media in the hands of a few who may control the dissemination of
information. One concern was that "the media gatekeepers will (1) slant
information according to their own biases, or (2) provide no outlet for
unorthodox or unpopular speech because it does not sell well, or both."
Congress's second concern about "horizontal concentration is that it can be
the basis of anticompetitive acts. For example, a market that is dominated
by one buyer of a product, a82monopsonist, does not give the seller any of
the benefits of competition.',
If a concentrated media industry is dependent upon major advertisers
or government funding, the risk of self-censorship increases.83 In a survey
of journalists, editors, and news executives in the U.S., "more than onethird responded that news is not reported if it might hurt advertising
revenues and thus harm the financial position of media firms."84 If the
advertisers consolidate (such as department stores), this lessening of
competition can also adversely affect media dependent on these advertisers
(such as daily newspapers which relied on Macy's, Bloomingdales, Lord &
Taylor, among others for advertising). 85 Although the failure of liberal talk
show Air America had many causes, it is interesting that according to an
ABC Radio Network memo, that ninety prominent advertisers, including
Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, Wal-Mart, Visa, Exxon-Mobil, Cingular, and
McDonalds, did not want their advertising running during any syndicated
Air America programming the ABC stations carried.86 Both advertisers
inevitably leads to self-censorship); BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (6th ed. 2000);
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS

TIMES 243 (1999) (stating that public broadcasting systems self-censor so as to not upset the wealthy
ruling class that supports them); Copps, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that the Commissioner heard
"first-hand from editorial page editors who have told me they can cover any story, save one-media
consolidation, and that they have been instructed to stay away from that one").
SI See, e.g., Trudy Lieberman, You Can't Report What You Don't Pursue, 39 COLUM.
JOURNALISM REv. 44, 44-49 (2000); Mark Crispin Miller, Can Viacom 's Reporters Cover Viacom 's
Interests?, 38 COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. 50, 50 (1999).

82 S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 29, 30 (1991). Congress sought to remedy these concerns in the 1992
Cable Act, with several provisions including the "must-carry," "subscriber limits," and "channel
occupancy" provisions. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(1)(B) ("must-carry"),
533(f)(l)(A)
("subscriber limits"), 533(f)(l)(B) ("channel occupancy") (2000)).
83

See WORLD BANK, BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS, WORLD DEV. REP. 2002 188

(2002),4 availableat http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/fulltext2002.htm.
9 ld.
85The extent to which consolidation has adversely impacted newspapers overall is not evident
from NAA data on newspaper revenues for retail and national advertising. Newspaper Association of
America, Advertising Expenditures, http://www.naa.org/TrendsandNumbers/Advertising-Expenditures.
aspx (last visited May 23, 2008).
8 Radio, in 2007 PEJ Report, supranote 31.
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and politicians may seek to take advantage of this self-censorship for their
own purposes. A case in point is the reported attempt by former Illinois
Governor Rod Blagojevich to induce the owner of the Chicago Tribune to
fire members of the newspaper's editorial board who had been calling for
the Governor's impeachment. The Tribune Company had been seeking
state financial assistance as part of its effort to sell the Chicago Cubs; the
Governor allegedly threatened to withhold that assistance unless changes
were made to the composition of the newspaper's editorial board.
According to an intercepted telephone conversation, the Governor's chief
of staff reported to his boss that the owner of the Tribune "got the
message. ' 8
Increased competition in the news market, on the other hand, can lead
to lower supply-driven bias. 88 The authors of one empirical study, for
example, found that in high feedback settings (such as weather or sports
reporting), bias is minimal. 89 In slow feedback settings, competition
impacts bias. Media firms in more competitive markets have stronger
incentives to reveal important information; the authors show quantitatively
that television news reports leading up to the 2000 presidential elections
were more equitable in their treatment of Bush and Gore in more
competitive media markets. This finding was consistent with several other
studies that show how competition among alternative sources of media
reduces supply-driven bias. 90
87Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Illinois Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich and his Chief of Staff
John Harris Arrested on Federal Corruption Charges, 10-12 (Dec. 9, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/prl209_0 .pdf; see also Affidavit in Support of
Application for Criminal Complaint, United States v. Rod R. Blagojevich (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 7, 2008),
IM69-85, availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/prl209Ola.pdf.
88Supply-driven bias means distorted, self-censored, or biased news coverage that primarily
originates with the media firms (i.e., on the supply side) and deviates from the news coverage that
consumers prefer. In contrast, demand-driven bias is when consumers demand biased news coverage
that comports with their pre-existing beliefs. See, e.g., Gentzkow & Shapiro, Market for News, supra
note 77, at 134, 144.
89Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media Bias & Reputation, 114 J. POL. EcoN. 280, 305
(2006).
90Id.at 309. The authors discuss elsewhere how increasing the number of independently-owned
firms can limit a media market's supply-driven bias in (i) increasing the likelihood that the media
remain independent when governments attempt to manipulate the news; (ii) reducing the risk of
information being suppressed or distorted when news providers have an interest in manipulating
consumers' beliefs; and (iii) driving media firms to invest in providing timely and accurate coverage.
Gentzkow & Shapiro, Market for News, supra note 77, at 135-44. But media competition, as the
authors note, may be ineffective in disciplining consumer-demand-driven bias. To avoid having their
personal beliefs challenged, consumers may demand biased news coverage, and trade-off accuracy of a
news source for confirmation of their pre-existing beliefs. Id. at 144-45. It is true that consumers are
not perfectly objective and rational Bayesians (in that they readily update prior factual beliefs whenever
appraised of reliable information). Their reasoning can be driven by directed goals, which can bias
their beliefs about themselves, other people, and events, their use of inferential rules, and their
evaluation of scientific evidence. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 480, 482-95 (1990). Although subject to information-processing biases, many people are not
delusional. They will eventually accept evidence challenging their pre-existing beliefs. Id. at 490
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Commercial radio, instead of a good example for permitting greater
The
media consolidation, may be an example of its dangers.
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act") weakened the
ownership limits on radio stations nationally and locally.9'
In analyzing radio mergers, the DOJ considered their economic impact
solely on advertisers and the rates they pay for advertising. 92 Although a
number of possible product markets exists (such as listenership and
programming), the DOJ focused in its radio consent decrees 93 on the
mergers' impact on advertisers and advertising rates as evaluated under the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 94 Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines'
approach, whether radio advertising is a relevant product market is based
in part on advertisers' likely response to a "small but significant and
nontransitory increase" in the advertising rates of the merging radio
stations. 95 The consent decrees acknowledge that radio stations also
compete for advertising services-for example, by offering live remote
broadcasts from an advertiser's place of business-but this tends to be a
value-added feature and is not the primary focus of the relief obtained.
Some of the antitrust product market questions addressed in the radio
merger consent decrees are as follows: (i) Would large numbers of
(noting that people will attempt to be rational and believe undesirable evidence if they cannot otherwise
refute it). Consequently, when a higher percentage of cable Fox News viewers (thirty-three percent)
erroneously believed that weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq by October 2003 compared
to the overall sample (twenty-two percent), one empirical issue is the extent to which media persuades
consumers versus consumers choose media sources that match their own political beliefs. Stefano
DellaVigna & Ethan Kaplan, The Political Impact of Media Bias, in FACT FINDER, FACT FILTER: How
MEDIA REPORTING AFFECTS PUBLIC POLICY (Roumeen Islam ed., forthcoming) (manuscript available
However, in seeking to
at http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/-sdellavi/wp/mediabiaswb07-06-25.pdf).
maintain their large diverse audiences, mainstream media may avoid catering too much to the biases of
particular consumers. For if perceived as too liberal (or conservative), they risk alienating other
moderate conservative (or liberal) consumers. Consequently, by switching to another less blatantly
biased media sources, the more objective (and thus marginal) consumer of a particular mainstream
news outlet may protect the more biased consumers of that media.
91Section 202 of the 1996 Act abolished the FCC's limits on the number of radio stations a single
entity could own nationally. On March 7, 1996, the FCC in revising Section 73.3555 of its Rules (47
C.F.R. § 73.3555) eliminated the national multiple radio ownership rule and relaxed the local
ownership rule. WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at I.
92See, e.g., Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Address at the ANA
Hotel: DOJ Analysis of Radio Mergers (Feb. 19, 1997), availableat 1997 WL 70922.
93See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Bain Capital, LLC, No.1:08-cv00245, at 5-7 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f230100/
230166.htm; Complaint for Injunctive Relief, United States v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc.
and AMFM Inc., No. 00-2063, at 2-3 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 29, 2000), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f6300/6329.htm (complaint filed with consent decree); United States v. CBS
Corp., No. 98CV00819, at 1-2 (D.D.C. Jun. 30, 1998), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10292 (proposed decree
requiring divestiture of radio stations to cure anticompetitive effect in radio advertising market); United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. 96 2563, at 1-2 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 1997), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3263.
94 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES

(1997), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/hmg0806l7.pdf.
9s See id. at 4.
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advertisers shift to other media?; (ii) Are there attributes of radio
advertising that make other media poor substitutes to many advertisers?;
and (iii) Can stations identify advertisers with strong radio preferences and
selectively raise prices? Similarly, in assessing competitive effects, the
DOJ inquires whether advertisers will end up paying more or getting less
after a radio merger. Some of the issues addressed in these consent decrees
include: (i) Have advertisers lost the ability to play one of the merging
companies' radio stations off against the other company's stations to get
better advertising rates?; (ii) Can advertisers buy around the merged entity
to reach a particular audience demographic?; and (iii) After the merger, can
advertisers reach their target audience with equivalent efficiency without
using the merged company's radio stations? 96 The DOJ's radio merger
consent decrees do not address nonprice competition unrelated to
advertising, including the quality of programming, listener choice, or the
likely impact of these mergers on the marketplace of ideas. Nor does the
DOJ refer to other possible markets such as programming markets or
listenership markets or consider consumer choice.
Significant ownership concentration ensued. Between March 1996 and
March 2007, the number of commercial radio stations increased 6.8%, but
the number of radio owners declined by 39%.97 This trend was already
apparent by 2001, by which time the number of radio owners had already
declined 25%.98
Over the same period, the size of the nation's largest radio group
owners increased: "In 1996, the two largest radio group owners controlled
62 and 53 stations, respectively. By March 2007, the leading radio group,
Clear Channel Communications, controlled over 1,100 radio stations." 99
One complaint, reported by the Project for Excellence in Journalism, was
"that Clear Channel's domination was diminishing the quality of the
AM/FM radio dial by monopolizing key markets and homogenizing
content."' 0 0 The former head of commercial radio Infinity Broadcasting
96See supra note 93.
" WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 1.
98FCC, REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDusTRY, 2001, at 3 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.fcc.

gov/mb/policy/docs/radio01 .pdf.
99 WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 1. In 2008, the Clear Channel controlled 833 U.S. radio stations,
508 of which are located in the largest 100 Arbitron markets. Competitive Impact Statement, Bain
CapitalLLC, No. 1:08-cv-00245, at 3-4.
'ooRadio, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 31. Critics have also complained that it exerted a
negative effect on American radio. Clear Channel also reported that:
[P]opularised voice-tracking, whereby segments of speech, music and commercials
were sent digitally from one Clear Channel network to another. These were then cut
and pasted into the radio programmes, giving the listener the impression that, for
example, a DJ was taking a live request or was doing an interview when, in fact,
they were not. Clear Channel argued that this technique allows it to deliver national
DJ talent to local markets that could not otherwise afford it. It also cuts costs.
Clear Channel Agrees $18.7bn Sale, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/6155284.stm.

CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW

(Vol. 42: 101

and CBS and current CEO of Sirius XM,Mel Karmazin, recognized that
commercial radio after the 1996 Act became "totally homogenized.''
Karmazin advocated the radio consolidation "[s]trictly for business
reasons. No one asked [him] if it was good for consumers.' 0 2
Radio was not alone in this trend toward concentration. Likewise, the
number of full-power television stations increased, 10 3 but the number of
unique television owners decreased. 1 4 The number of newspapers
remained about the same between 2002 and 2005, but the number of
newspaper owners declined from 422 to 389.105
The ownership concentration in radio was felt on the local level.016
The number of local cross-ownerships between radio and television
stations increased. 10 7 One empirical study relied upon by the FCC showed
that the amount of news for these cross-ownership stations was
consistently less than their peers: "[T]he average effect of radio crossownership on local news coverage is consistently negative," i.e., less
news. 108 Not only were local radio markets more concentrated, but a few
radio firms dominated local advertising. On the local level, the largest firm
in each radio metro market has, on average, forty-six percent of the
market's total radio advertising revenue; the largest two firms have, on
average, seventy-four percent of the radio advertising revenue.1°9
Although radio listening declined since 1998, radio advertising rates
between 1996 and 2006 have nearly doubled, suggesting that even on this
dimension, the antitrust review may have been inadequate. As one recent
FCC study concluded, the Consumer Price Index "increased approximately
3 percent per year during this time period, while the annual growth rate in

101
Phil

Rosenthal, Homogenized Radio Stations Bottle up Growth, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 11,

2007, 102
at C3.
id
103Letter from JayEtta Z. Hecker, Dir., Physical Infrastructure Issues, Gov't Accountability
Office, to The Honorable Edward J. Markey, Chairman, Subcomm. on Telecomms. and the Internet,
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 5 (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d08330r.pdf (875 in 1970 to 1754 in 2006) (hereinafter GAO].
'04
Kiran Duwadi et al., Media Ownership Study Two: Ownership Structure and Robustness of
Media 11, at 11 tbl.5, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A3.
pdf (between 2002 and 2005 number of television stations increased from 1739 to 1764 as the number
of unique television station owners decreased from 491 to 480).
105Id.

,o6
The average number of radio station owners across all metro markets declined from 13.5 in
1996 to 9.4 in 2007. WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 8.
1o7The number of TV/radio station cross-ownerships in the same market increased from 273
television/656 radio stations in 2002 to 333 television/782 radio stations in 2005. Duwadi et al., supra
note 104, at 6, 8, 11.
"sJeffrey Milyo, The Effects of Cross-Ownership on the Local Content and Political Slant of
Local Television News 21 (Rev. Sept. 2007), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_pubic/
attachmatch/DA-07-3470A7.pdf. The FCC relied upon this study as evidence of how newspapers can
spread their fixed costs over other media to increase news content, which is discussed infra notes 11321 and accompanying text.
109
WILLIAMS,supra note 33, at 2.
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radio prices was approximately 10 percent."' 10
The claim was frequently made in the 1990s that consolidation would
allow radio owners to offer a more diverse array of formats."' But it is not
evident that increased radio ownership concentration has led to greater
program diversity. According to one FCC study, between March 1996 and
March 2007, the average number of formats appears to have declined
slightly for some of the large markets, while increasing slightly for most of
the smaller ones. Overall,
the variety of radio formats available to
1 12
consumers has held steady.
The traditional deregulatory, anti-interventionist argument is that the
free market will adjust to match viewer preferences, so that ownership does
not matter. But in a study of FCC data, several consumer groups claim that
less news is broadcast in cities where companies have been granted
waivers to the FCC cross-ownership rules to allow them to own
both
13
newspapers and broadcasters, although the evidence is equivocal.
While the FCC noted that the empirical evidence in the record
supported "both sides
concerning the relationship
between
newspaper/broadcast combinations and localism," the FCC concluded that
"[o]n balance . . . the evidence suggests that some newspaper/broadcast
cross-ownership combinations can enhance localism."' 1 4 The FCC,
however, relied in particular on one study of twenty-nine cross-owned
television stations in twenty-seven markets, which concluded that "local
television newscasts for cross-owned stations contain on average about 1-2
minutes more news coverage overall, or 4-8% more than the average for
non-cross-owned stations."'" 15
But the study's author recognized several important caveats. First, the
study's sample was small: time and resource constraints limited him to
"only three days during the week prior to the 2006 general elections on
Tuesday, November 7th."' " 6 The second caveat was that these three days
may not be representative for the remainder of the year." 7 A third caveat
is that he looked only at late-evening local news, which may not represent
a station's daily news coverage. A fourth caveat is that his analysis
"cannot determine whether local television stations (cross-owned or not)
The CPI increased twenty-nine percent during the same period. Id at 16.
See, e.g., Matt Spangler, Can't Find Nothin' on Radio?, RADIO & RECORDS, July 31, 1998,
availableat http://www.radiodiversity.com/nothingonradio.html.
..
2 WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 2.
113See Further Comments of Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America and Free Press
(Oct. 27, 2007), at 6-8, 86-87, availableat http://stopbigmedia.com/filing/critiquecomplete.pdf.
1142008 FCC Report, supra note 54, at 2034.
115Milyo, supra note 108, at 1.
116
1d. at 8.
' Id. at 9 ("[T]he behavior of local news stations may not be the same during the week just prior
10
"'

to the general elections compared to other times of the year" so "the findings of this study may not be
representative of differences in local news coverage by cross-ownership throughout the rest of the
year. ).
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present news in a balanced or biased manner."' 1 8 Some of the author's
findings were surprising nonetheless given the upcoming elections. Local
stations broadcast approximately twenty-six minutes of total news
coverage, with about eighty percent of this time devoted to local stories.
But actual "local news, excluding sports and weather, accounts for a little
less than half (46%) of the total news time. Finally, state and local
political coverage averages just about three minutes per newscast for the
dates under study."' 1 9 The amount of incremental news coverage from
cross-owned televisions stations was only "about [twenty-one] seconds.""12
One FCC-sponsored peer review of this study concluded that, given these
caveats:
[T]he empirical data in the study are so limited that the
study's conclusions do not and cannot possess the reasonable
level of confidence necessary to provide policymakers with
useful evidence on which to base their regulatory decisions.
Put simply, the findings from a single three-day study of one
type of news broadcast should not form the evidentiary basis
for any sort of public policy making.121
The media consolidation debate concerns not only the quantity of
independent media owners, but the extent to which programming is
affected when a radio or television station is owned by a large out-ofmarket station group as opposed to a local independent owner. As of 2005,
a minority of the newspapers and commercial radio and television stations
were locally owned: 210 of the nation's 1381 commercial television
stations, 4827 of the 10,893 nation's commercial radio stations, and 444 of
the nation's 1445 newspapers. In contrast, the majority of non-commercial
radio and television stations were locally owned: 1671 of 2697 noncommercial radio stations and 229 of the 383 non-commercial television
stations. 122 There is some evidence that large public companies tend to
sacrifice journalistic quality in pursuit of the bottom line. Good journalism
is expensive, and yields social benefits that are not captured in the balance
sheet. In a large study in 2003, the Project for Excellence in Journalism
("PEJ") ranked television news programs from best to worst and divided
stations into groups based on the size of the owner.' 23 PEJ found the news
11'

Id. at 30.

"91d. at 16.
120

ld.

121

Kenneth Goldstein et al., Invited PeerReview of FCCMedia Ownership Study 6, MB Docket

No. 06-121, Oct. 30, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/peer_review/prstudy6a.pdf.
122 Duwadi et al., supra note 104, at 6, 8, 9.
123To examine size, the authors separated the TV companies studied into four categories, using
the FCC rankings of audience reach. Their measurement of audience reach followed the FCC's policy

of discounting for the difference between the reach of UHF versus VHF stations.
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programs of the smallest owners to be 30% high quality, compared with
12% for the largest owners. Likewise, the smallest owners had 17% news
programs graded as low quality, compared to 23% of the largest owners.
In general, as ownership size increased, news quality decreased. 124 On the
other hand, the study also found that a television station's cross-ownership
of a newspaper led to better grades. Stations in cross-ownership situations
were more than twice as likely to receive an "A" grade as were other
stations. 125
Two FCC economists also prepared a draft study in 2004 which
examined the question whether local ownership of television stations had
any impact on the amount of local news broadcast by the stations. The
authors found that locally-owned television stations produced more local
news-about five and one-half minutes more local news per half-hour
program-than non-locally-owned stations. 126 The study was not finalized
and its conclusions were not made public at the time. 127 It was later
alleged that the study was suppressed because the study's findings were at
odds with the FCC, which was reportedly facing pressure from the
broadcast industry to conclude that media ownership rules were too
restrictive and should be loosened. Allegations were also made that the
FCC staff were ordered to destroy all copies of the draft. 12 8 In an internal
investigation of these allegations, the FCC's Office of Inspector General
found it likely that the study was not released for legitimate reasons, and it
was unable to find evidence that anyone at the FCC ordered the draft to be

STUDY OF OWNERSHIP AND QUALITY 2003, 1-2, 7 n.5 (2003), available at http://www.joumalism.org/
node/243.
124Id. at 3. "In analyzing content across local markets... [James Hamilton similarly] found that
group-owned television stations carried fewer hard news stories, network affiliates did more stories in
their local news programs about the network's entertainment programming, and that papers owned by
chains covered a higher percentage of soft news topics." JAMES T. HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT'S
FIT TO SELL 249 (2004).
125The study's authors, like the FCC in liberalizing the cross-ownership ban, thought that crossownership suggested that the joint resources of a newspaper and TV station freed up people to do more
original work. But as their study revealed, the cross-owned stations actually scored lower on the
enterprise index in general, and particularly in the area of sending out reporters to cover stories: "[T]he
generalized sign of higher quality at cross-owned stations, for some reason, did not include those
stations doing more enterprise." PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE INJOURNALISM, supra note 123, at 12.
126Peter J. Alexander & Keith Brown, Do Local Owners Deliver More Localism? Evidence
From Local Broadcast News (Jan. 15, 2004) (FCC Working Paper), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
ownership/materials/already-released/doownersdeliver0I 1504.pdf.
127Before Kevin Martin's confirmation hearings as the incoming FCC Chair, Senator Barbara
Boxer received a copy of the report "'indirectly from someone within the FCC who believed the
information should be made public."' John Dunbar, Media Study Was Ordered Destroyed, Lawyer
Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 14, 2006 (quoting Boxer spokeswoman Natalie Ravitz).
128Id.; see also John Dunbar, FCC Quashed Contrary Reports: Research Supported Notion that

Local Ownership of TV Stations Strengthened News, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 26, 2007, at
A4.
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destroyed. 129 But Senator Boxer and FCC Commissioner 30Michael Copps
were unconvinced by the Inspector General's conclusions.
Also during the Bush administration, the staff of the FCC's Media
Bureau prepared a draft report titled "Review of the Radio Industry
2003."'' This draft report indicated that over seven years there had been a
thirty-five percent decline in the number of radio station owners, and that
the largest two firms in each radio market had, on average, seventy-four
percent of the market's radio advertising revenue. 32 The draft report was
similar in format and methodology to other annual reports, but unlike the
earlier reports the 2003 report was not released. It later was revealed that
the Chief of the FCC's Media Bureau in an internal email said that he was
"not inclined to release this one unless the story can be told in a much
more positive way. This is not the time to be stirring the 'radio
consolidation' pot.' ' 133 As with the draft study on local television news,
there were allegations that the draft radio report was suppressed for
political reasons. The FCC's Inspector General concluded that the
decision not to go forward with the release process was permissible and not
an attempt to conceal information. However, the Inspector General was
troubled by the aftermath of the decision, noting that the staff may have
been instructed to deny that a draft report even existed. 134
E. Impact on Women and Minority Ownership of Media
As then-Senator Obama recognized, "[m]inority-owned radio stations,
television stations and newspapers played an essential role in battling
segregation during the civil rights movement."' 35 One of the starkest
effects of consolidation in the radio and television industries has been its
129See

FED. COMMUNICATIONS

COMM'N,

OFFICE

OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,

SEMIANNUAL

REPORT, OCTOBER 1, 2007-MARCH 31 2008, at 33, available at http://www.fcc.gov/oig/SARFCC

OIG_04302008.pdf [hereafter OIG Semiannual Report].
130See John Eggerton, FCC Didn't Quash Studies, Says Inspector General: No Evidence FCC
Under Former Chairman Powell Destroyed or Suppressed Media-Ownership Reports, BROADCASTING
& CABLE, Oct. 5, 2007, available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/100044-FCCDidnt_
Quash_StudiesSays Inspector General.php. Commissioner Copps noted:
[The OIG Semiannual Report] doesn't include interviews with key FCC staff. It
declined to seek interviews with FCC officials all the way up the chain of command.
And it doesn't explain why a study that reached striking and exceedingly relevant
conclusions wasn't finalized and made a part of the record, even though supervising
economists concluded that the technical flaws could be easily fixed. The nagging
feeling remains that we don't yet have the entire story.
Id.
131FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, MEDIA BUREAU, REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY 2003

(Sept. 2003), availableat http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-released/review90003.pdf.
132
Id.at 2.

1OIG Semiannual Report, supra note 129, at 35.
' Id.at 36-37.
135
Obarna & Kerry, supra note 10.
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effect on minority and women ownership.
In broadcast radio, a study done by Free Press found that the
percentage of women and minority radio station owners was lower in
highly concentrated radio markets than in less concentrated markets. The
less concentrated markets also tend to be the larger markets, where FCC
ownership rules have limited to some extent the opportunities for
consolidation. However, even if the size of the market and the level of
minority population in the market are held constant, the study found that
markets with minority owners are significantly less concentrated than
markets without minority owners. A similar examination of female
ownership shows that markets with a female-owned radio station are
significantly less concentrated than markets without such stations. The
Free Press study concluded:
One unambiguous consequence of further industry
consolidation and concentration will be to diminish both the
number of minority-owned stations and the number of
female-owned stations. The FCC should seriously consider
the effects on women and minority owners and their listeners
before it moves to enact
policies that will lead to increased
36
market concentration.'
A similar trend has been seen in other media. A recent FCC-sponsored
study on the impact of the relaxation of the television duopoly rule found
that the major beneficiaries were the largest twenty-five television
groups. 137 The losers were minorities and women. The study found that
the percentage of minority and women owners declined significantly after
the rule was relaxed in 1999. The specific findings were as follows:
Across all markets in which minority-owned television
stations operated between 1999 and 2006, the number of
minority-owned television stations dropped by twenty-seven
percent.... Minority owners were roughly three times more
likely to leave a market than to enter it. . ... Thirty-nine
percent of minority owned stations in TV duopoly markets
were sold to non-minority owners .... Thirty-six percent of
136Off the

Dial: Female and Minority Radio Station Ownership in the UnitedStates, FREE PRESS,

June 2007, at 31, availableat http://www.freepress.net/files/off the dial.pdf.

131ALLEN S. HAMMOND ET AL., THE IMPACT OF THE FCC's TV DUOPOLY RULE RELAXATION ON

MINORITY

AND

WOMEN

OWNED

BROADCAST

STATIONS

1999-2006,

at

3,

available at

http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatchDA-07-3470A9.pdf. The GAO found the FCC data
on the gender, race, and ethnicity of radio and television station owners biennially through its
Ownership Report for Commercial Broadcast Stations, or Form 323 "suffer from three weaknesses: (1)
exemptions from filing for certain types of broadcast stations, such as noncommercial stations; (2)
inadequate data quality procedures; and (3) problems with data storage and retrieval." The GAO
concluded from the available evidence from FCC and nongovernmental reports that ownership of
broadcast outlets by these groups is "limited." GAO, supra note 103, at 3.

CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42: 101

the female owned stations operating in duopoly markets
[were] sold to non-female, non-minority owners.' 38
Consequently, as the FCC-sponsored study concluded, the relaxation of the
television duopoly rule benefited neither women nor minority owners.
Relaxation of the FCC ownership limits has tended to drive up
valuations of stations, pricing potential purchasers (small businesses and
broadcasters including minorities and women entrepreneurs and owners)
out of the market. The rise in station prices may have benefited owners of
existing stations by allowing them to sell out at higher prices. It may
thereby have benefited a class of minority or women owners-the sellersbut it did not benefit the goal of preserving or increasing minority
ownership or ownership by women. "Racial and ethnic minorities make up
33 percent of our population," said FCC Commissioner Copps, but they
"own a scant 3 percent of all full-power commercial TV stations.' 39 As
former FCC Commissioner Adelstein added, "When it comes to ensuring
that the ownership of the public's airways-which are licensed to serve the
public-look
like the American people, the FCC's legacy does not make us
40
proud."'0

The decrease in minority and women owners can also affect the news
content in that community. Professor Joel Waldfogel argues that in
industries with high fixed costs like broadcasting or newspapers, the
market tends to favor the tastes of the majority over "preference
minorities. 14 ' When fixed costs are high, a market can accommodate
relatively fewer products than when fixed costs are low. Not only are these
products more likely to target large rather than small groups, the relative
size of the large group to the small group can actually make the smaller
group less well off in terms of product targeting. Media markets are more
similar to "winner takes all" political markets than is generally
supposed. 4 2 Professor Waldfogel uses the example of radio programming
to show that formats that appeal to a particular group will not be offered
unless that group is relatively large. The same is true with newspapers in
the sense of how they position themselves. In other words, the market
does not ensure that everyone goes home happy:
I don't get the sort of newspaper that I want just because I
138HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 137,
139Copps, supra note 8, at 5.
140Statement of FCC Commissioner

at 3, 48, 56.
Jonathan S. Adelstein, Concurs and Dissents in Part in

Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services et al., 2 (Dec. 18, 2007),
availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-279035A4.pdf.
"" JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET 5 (2007).
142See id.at 6. "In spite of the liberation rhetoric often used

to describe the market, the same
kinds of groups disadvantaged by majority rule-small groups with different preferences-can find
themselves at a disadvantage in product markets as well. This raises a challenge to the common
exhortation 'Let the market decide."' Id.
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want it. I get what I want if many other people also want it.
Second, a larger population preferring something else
actually makes me worse off, thereby failing to avoid strains
on social cohesion. This evidence stands
43 in stark contrast
markets.1
of
portraits
idealized
with many
Professor Waldfogel takes the analysis a step further, showing that the
presence or absence of minority-targeted local media has a measurable
effect on voter turnout. The presence of Spanish-language local television
news raises Hispanic voter turnout from an average of thirty-one percent to
about forty percent in nonpresidential election years, or by about a third.
In presidential years, the presence of Spanish-language local television
news raises Hispanic turnout by about a sixth. "These are large effects,"
Professor Waldfogel concludes. 144 In addition, he finds that the entry of a
Spanish language local television news program results in an overall
increase in Hispanic turnout by about five percentage points. Similarly,
African American voter turnout is about ten to fifteen percent higher in
areas with a weekly newspaper or a radio station specifically targeted to
African Americans. In addition, African American voter turnout increases
by a dramatic percentage in metropolitan areas that get a first radio station
targeted to African Americans.
IV. CALLS FOR LIBERALIZATION TO PROTECT TRADITIONAL MEDIA

With traditional media in flux and the growth of new media, some
argue that antitrust should have a limited role in this industry and that the
FCC should ease restrictions on media ownership. We discuss, in this
section, whether the Obama administration should permit greater
After critiquing the FCC's
consolidation in the media industry.
justification in 2008 to relax media cross-ownership restrictions, we show
why the number of media sources in a given community (or nationwide)
may be a poor indicator of the marketplace's competitiveness.
A. Moving Beyond a Laissez-FaireAttitude
Before the economic crisis, the Bush administration generally had
great faith that free market forces correct market failures, and little faith in
Even before our
government institutions promoting competition. 145
43

1 Id. at 57.
'44

Id. at 82.
Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, supra note 23, at 1020-25; see also RICHARD A.

145See

POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION xii, 113,

134-35, 236 (2009) (criticizing the Bush administration's laissez-faire attitudes). The federal antitrust
agencies similarly had a hands-off approach, with a few exceptions, to the media industries. But in his
last weeks, the FCC Chair reflected on the nation's economic crisis:
My philosophy throughout my time at the FCC including the last four years as
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economy's unraveling, this view of markets generally-and media markets
specifically-was empirically suspect.146 In understanding these issues,
the Obama administration cannot blindly rely on neoclassical economic
theory's simplistic assumptions about human behavior or efficient
markets. 47 The purpose and benefits of a competitive marketplace of ideas
differentiate media markets from other markets.
Ideally, the federal competition agencies in the Obama administration
should do or sponsor more empirical work to better understand the
competitive dynamics of media industries and how they differ from other
industries. 48 More empirical work is necessary-in particular, work that
goes beyond advertising markets and includes non-price competition.
Currently, the FCC, under the 1996 Act, must justify--empirically-its
existing ownership regulations in its biennial review. If the FCC cannot
readily supply this empirical evidence, the courts have construed the 1996
Act as requiring the FCC to further deregulate. 49 Given the empirical
difficulties in testing the correlation between media consolidation and
viewpoint diversity, the current default standard effectively favors further
media deregulation. We urge that before any further deregulation is
undertaken, the Obama administration should study or sponsor studies of
chairman has been to pursue deregulation while paying close attention to its impact
on consumers and the particulars of a given market; to balance deregulation with
consumer protection. . . . We must also be creative and flexible in our approach
making sure government is working for consumers. Most of that time that means
getting out of the way. But sometimes we must recognize that there is a unique role
only government can play. In order to have credibility calling for deregulation we
must be willing to act in a targeted limited fashion when the market isn't properly
working is important for another reason as well. As the current financial crisis has
reminded us problems don't disappear if they are simply ignored. They can become
bigger problems requiring the government to intervene in a larger way later.
Kevin J. Martin, FCC Chairman, Remarks at The Reg-Markets Center of the American Enterprise
Institute, Balancing Deregulation and Consumer Protection 2, 9 (Jan. 8, 2009), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-287777Al .doc (last visited July 3, 2009).
146
See Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, supra note 23, at 1009-12 ("This conception of
competition ... lacks an empirical basis.").
147See Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want? Competition Policy & the Role
of
Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1419751 (examining neoclassical economic theory's assumption of self-interest); Maurice E.
Stucke, BehavioralEconomists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
513, 520-21 (2007) [hereinafter Stucke, Behavioral Economists] (discussing the intersection of
antitrust and behavioral economics); Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, GLOBAL COMPETITION
POL'Y (GCP) MAG., Jan. 2009, at 5, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1323815 ("Contrary to
neoclassical economic theory, actual behavior ... may vary.").
148Toward that end, the FTC recently announced several upcoming workshops to address these
issues. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Extra! Extra! FTC Announces Workshop: 'Can News
Media Survive the Internet Age? Competition, Consumer Protection, and First Amendment
Perspectives'
(May 19, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/05/news2009.shtm.
49
1 See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media Consolidation: An
Empirical Study 8 (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l121229 ("More recently,
relying on the 1996 Act, the D.C. Circuit in a series of cases has questioned and demanded evidence for
the Commission's invocation of the convergence hypothesis.").
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the effects of media consolidation to date.
B. Should We Allow More Newspapers and Television Stations to Merge?
In 2008, the FCC voted to relax media cross-ownership restrictions.5 0
Then-FCC Chair Kevin Martin's proposal to loosen the newspaperbroadcast cross-ownership ban in the top twenty cities was more limited
than his predecessor's attempt at wholesale transformation of the media
ownership rules. Nonetheless, opposition was not long in coming. The
U.S. Senate expressed its displeasure through a "resolution of
disapproval,"''5 and the new FCC Chair is believed to oppose the
weakening of the cross-ownership rules. 5 2 Among other things, critics
argued that Chairman Martin's proposal had a loophole that would allow
cross-ownership in smaller markets, not just in the twenty largest
markets. 5' 3
The FCC's rationale for allowing owners of certain newspapers and
television stations in the same market to merge is based on efficiencies: the
merger will enable the owners to spread their high fixed costs for obtaining
news over a greater audience. Thereby, the newspaper-television owner
will have greater incentive to produce more news. 5 4 The FCC's key
assumption is that cross-ownership in "the largest markets can preserve the
1S0
The vote was three to two along

party lines. See 2008 FCC Report, supra note 54, at 99, 106,

113 (containing the opinions of each of the five commissioners). The FCC adopted a presumption, in
the top twenty Designated Market Areas ("DMAs"), that it is consistent with the public interest for one
entity to own a daily newspaper and a radio station or, under the following circumstances, a daily
newspaper and a television station, if (1) the television station is not ranked among the top four stations
in the DMA and (2) at least eight independent "major media voices" remain in the DMA. In all other
instances, the FCC will adopt a presumption that a newspaper/broadcast station combination would not
be in the public interest, with two exceptions, and therefore emphasize that the FCC is unlikely to
approve such transactions. Taking into account these respective presumptions, in determining whether
the grant of a transaction that would result in newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership is in the public
interest, the FCC will consider the following: (1) whether the cross-ownership will increase the amount
of local news disseminated through the affected media outlets in the combination; (2) whether each
affected media outlet in the combination will exercise its own independent news judgment; (3) the level
of concentration in the Nielsen DMA; and (4) the financial condition of the newspaper or broadcast
outlet, and if the newspaper or broadcast station is in financial distress, the proposed owner's
commitment to invest significantly in newsroom operations. The FCC discussed the need to support
the availability and sustainability of local news while not significantly increasing local concentration or
harming diversity. Id. at 95-96.
l5' John Dunbar, Senate Votes to Roll Back Media Ownership Rule, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 16,
2008.
152 Editorial, Media Ownership Rules Safe in FCC Nominee Julius Genachowski's
Hands,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/
2008633309_edital6fccboss.html.
153 See, e.g., Craig Aaron et al., Devil in the Details: 10 Facts Kevin Martin Doesn't
Want You to
Know About His New Media Ownership Rules, FREE PRESS, Nov. 2007, at 6-7, available at
http://fieepress.net/files/devil in the details.pdf.
"4 2008 FCC Report, supra note 54, at 24-25.
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viability of newspapers without threatening diversity by allowing them to
spread their operational costs across multiple platforms," and newspapers
"can improve or increase the news offered by the broadcaster and the
newspaper."' 55
The FCC Chair defended relaxing the ownership
restrictions to protect newspapers: "The newspaper industry has faced
significant challenges recently and I feel 5we
6 have to do all we can to ensure
we continue to have a vibrant industry."'
Opponents have questioned whether the FCC should worry about
newspapers' financial health since newspapers are generally outside the
scope of the agency's expertise. Another question is whether the case has
been made that the newspaper industry actually needs or would benefit
from this particular type of regulatory relief. It is worth recalling that in
2000, The New York Times Company Chairman Arthur Sulzberger Jr.
said, "[f]rom a business perspective, we will not achieve the financial
157
success that can be ours without entering the world of television."'
Seven years later, The New York Times Company sold its nine TV
stations, and left its partnership with Discovery Communications on a joint
TV channel.' 58 What changed? Apparently, the expected synergies never
materialized. Moreover, newspapers-including The New York Timesdiscovered that it was cheaper to shoot digital video of a news event and
post it on the newspaper's own website. This low cost video has proven to
be popular with both viewers and advertisers.' 59
Besides, less restrictive alternatives exist to a full newspaper-television
station merger. Content-sharing arrangements are already in place in many
60
markets, although apparently not in the very largest markets.
Newspapers can and do collaborate with local television networks to
promote their news content in ways that do not involve a full merger.
Finally, even if a newspaper/television station combination yields
some efficiencies, one must ask, "at what price?"
The inherent
inefficiency of the marketplace of ideas sets it apart from mergers of
' Id. at 23-24.
156Stephen

Labaton, Few Friendsfor Proposalon Media, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at Cl. The

industry trade association, Newspaper Association of America, however, complained that the FCC's
three Republican Commissioners did not go far enough in relaxing the cross-ownership ban. Id.
07 Frank Ahrens, Newspaper-TV MarriageShows Signs of Strain, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2007, at
DO 1.
158Id.
159Id. Two other companies also announced they will be splitting their assets. Belo will spin off
its newspapers from its local television business. E.W. Scripps will spin off from its newspaper and
local television assets and turn its cable networks-including HGTV-into a new company.
Newspapers, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 28.
160See GAO, supra note 103, at 2. The GAO's recent survey of several media markets found
agreements among stations to share content or agreements that allow one company to produce
programming or sell advertising through two outlets. These agreements "were prevalent in a variety of
markets but not in the top three markets, suggesting that market size may influence the benefits that
companies realize through such agreements." Id.
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ordinary commodities.
In industries with high fixed costs and
homogeneous products, a merger may enable firms to achieve economies
of scale by rationalizing production lines. The machines run for longer
periods, with greater output. Consumers in these industries may not desire
product variety, so this loss of diversity is insignificant. But in the
marketplace of ideas, a premium is placed on diversity of ideas. 16' Indeed,
a concern with cost-savings efficiencies
may point in the wrong direction
162
stake.
at
are
values
when other
Cost-savings efficiencies may be beneficial when they yield greater
output of better quality programming, but cost-savings alone are not
dispositive. Many competing independent news sources may confer a
greater benefit to society than an efficient monopolist that produces a
homogenous news product. It might be very efficient if all the newspapers
combined their news collection operations into one operation. News
collection generally has high fixed costs. To report a story may cost the
same if you have one reader or a million readers. This cost is reduced with
each additional newspaper that is sold or read. Under one operation, the
newspapers could eliminate their back offices, duplicate news bureaus, etc.
The joint venture could better utilize its scarce resources, and achieve
significant cost savings unattainable outside the venture. This joint venture
may produce a lower-cost newspaper, with a lower newsstand price, so
instead of paying fifty cents, one may pay a quarter for the newspaper.
The AAI expressed similar concerns following the computer system
failure of the Voter News Service ("VNS") during the 2002 midterm
election. VNS was a joint venture among five major TV news
organizations (ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox, and CNN), and the Associated
Press, and was designed to produce and analyze election exit polling
information. Until the 1988 election, the major news organizations did
their own exit polling and made their election predictions independently.
In 1990, ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN formed "Voter Research & Surveys,"
combining their exit polling operations as a cost saving measure.
Following the 2000 elections, AAI blamed the networks' erroneous
reporting of the presidential election results on the void of competition and
urged the government to break up VNS. While disbanding VNS, all six
major news organizations still rely on the same data and the same models,

161While

the newspaper venture may be more efficient, the marketplace of ideas would be

diminished. See, e.g., Paddock Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996)
("A market in which every newspaper carried the same stories, columns, and cartoons would be a less
vigorous market than the existing one.").
162As the former FTC Chairman noted, "an occasional loss of efficiency as a result of antitrust
enforcement can be tolerated and is to be expected if antitrust is to serve other legitimate values."
Robert Pitofsky, The PoliticalContent of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1074 (1979); see also
BAKER, supra note 17, at 43-44.
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rather than compete to predict election results the most accurately.163
Consequently, when cost-saving efficiencies are claimed in media
mergers, the Obama administration should recognize the tension between
cost-savings efficiencies arising from product homogenization, on the one
hand, and a media policy seeking greater diversity in the marketplace of
ideas, on the other.
C. Number of Media Sources May Be a PoorIndicatorof Competitiveness
In relaxing its cross-ownership rules, the FCC noted that the number of
television and radio stations on the air since 1975 increased: the number of
radio and television stations increased by approximately 76% and 83.5%,
respectively.' 64 It is a mistake, however, to confuse the number of media
outlets with the robustness of competition in the marketplace of ideas.
Ordinarily for commodity goods with a downward sloping demand
curve, an increase in output is a good proxy of increased competitiveness.
But in the media industry, the increase in outlets delivering news "has
generally not meant covering a broader range of stories.' 6 5 Media
industries may differ from other industries for several reasons.
First, "the number of independently owned media outlets in a given
market," as the Government Accountability Office found, "is not always a
good indicator of how many independently
produced local news or other
66
market."'
a
in
available
are
programs
Second, an increase in output (more media outlets) could simply mean
fewer owners controlling more outlets. As discussed earlier, between
March 1996 and March 2007, the number of commercial radio stations
increased 6.8%, but the number of radio owners decreased by 39%.I67
Likewise, the number of full-power television stations significantly
increased, while the number of unique television owners decreased. The
number of newspapers remained about the same between 2002 and 2005,
163AAI

Calls, Again, for Breakup of Voters News Service, AM. ANTITRUST INST., Nov. 19, 2002,

available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/215.ashx; see also Kate Pickert, A BriefHistory
of Exit Polling, TIME, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1856081,00.
html?iid=digg_share.
1642008 FCC Report, supra note 54, at 15-16.
16 Overview, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 31.
l6 GAO, supra note 103, at 7. In five markets which the GAO surveyed, the television stations
were participating in operating agreements. The five markets were Nashville, Tennessee; Wilkes
Barre/Scranton, Pennsylvania; Springfield, Missouri; Myrtle Beach/Florence, South Carolina; and
Terre Haute, Indiana. For example, in Wilkes Barre/Scranton, the GAO identified eight television
stations. However:
[O]ne owner of two stations participated in an agreement with a third station and the
remaining four television stations participated in two separate agreements---each
agreement covering two stations. Thus, while there are eight television stations and
seven owners in Wilkes Barre/Scranton, there are [actually only] three loose
commercial groupings in the market.
Id.
167 See supra note 97 and accompanying text; WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 1.
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but the number of newspaper owners also declined.
Third, media sources are not interchangeable or of equal weight. Some
defense counsel in a media merger justify an "all media market," as many
local outlets carry some news or advertising. But the empirical evidence
shows the continuing importance of the local daily newspaper, followed by
the local television station in gathering and investigating news. 69 Thus to
observe that forty media outlets exist in one city may say little about the
competitiveness of the marketplace of ideas. Typically, many publications
cover discrete commodities (such as autos or real estate), are targeted for
specific religious or ethnic audiences, or are limited to community events.
Given the "relatively unanimous support" that consumers "continue
predominantly to get their local news from daily newspapers and broadcast
television,'170 allowing these two dominant news sources to merge can
pose greater risk to the marketplace of ideas
than allowing a newspaper to
71
acquire other less news-intensive media.1
168See
'69 See,

supra note 105 and accompanying text; Duwadi etal., supra note 104, at 11.
e.g., 2008 FCC Report, supra note 54, at 33 ("Media Ownership Study Number I

('Nielsen Survey') indicates, for example that 38.2 percent of all respondents consider broadcast
television stations and 30.1 percent consider local newspapers 'the most important source of local news
or local current affairs,' whereas only 6.7 percent of all respondents say the same concerning the
Internet."
(internal citations omitted)).
70
1 Id.
171In 2003, the FCC introduced a "Diversity Index" that sought to give its media ownership
framework an empirical footing. The Diversity Index was modeled on the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index ("HHr') used by the federal antitrust agencies in merger cases. Prometheus Radio Project v.
FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2004). The FCC selected which media to include based on
consumers' reported preferences. Id. at 403. It then weighted the media based on their popularity (for
example, television stations received a greater weight than newspapers). To apply the Diversity Index
in a specific market, the FCC counted the number of media outlets in the market. Each outlet of a
certain type of media was given an equal weight with every other outlet of the same type. Id. Finally,
the FCC summed the squares of the weighted ownership shares to calculate the market's Diversity
Index score. Id.at 404. The Third Circuit rejected the FCC's Diversity Index for a number of reasons,
including the equal weighting of outlets. Id. at 402-03. As the Third Circuit wrote, "[a] Diversity
Index that requires us to accept that a community college television station makes a greater contribution
to viewpoint diversity than a conglomerate that includes the third-largest newspaper in America [The
New York Times] also requires us to abandon both logic and reality." Id. at 408. The FCC
subsequently recognized that its Diversity Index is an inaccurate tool for measuring diversity, that some
aspects of diversity may be difficult to quantify, and thus abandoned its Diversity Index. 2008 FCC
Report, supra note 54, at 11-12. Professor Eli Noam and DOJ attorney Brian Hill have each suggested
alternatives to the Diversity Index designed to remedy the shortcomings the Third Circuit identified.
Professor Noam proposes adding a measure of the number of voices in a market to generate a combined
number that corrects the concentration index by giving better scores to markets with more distinct
voices. Eli Noam, How to Measure Media Concentration,FIN. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/da3Obf5e-fa9d-lid8-9a7l-00000e2511c8.html.
The insight behind this
approach is that one is better off with the choice of more radio stations on the dial or another newspaper
at the kiosk even if these outlets do not draw large crowds. Id. Mr. Hill proposes an entirely new
formula that he argues is better able to satisfy the major two assumptions that both the FCC and Third
Circuit thought were critical: (1) diversity in a media market should not decrease with ownership
concentration; and (2) the contribution to diversity of an individual entity, its diversity importance,
should increase with the weighted market shares of that entity's outlets. Brian C. Hill, Measuring
Media Market Diversity: Concentration, Importance, and Pluralism, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 169, 170
(2006). In this regard, a recent thoughtful article highlighted the challenges of empirically capturing
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Fourth, even if two competing television stations had comparable
weight, it is problematic, or as Judge Learned Hand asserted "impossible,"
to treat different news services as "interchangeable.' 72 In United States v.
AssociatedPress, newspapers, which were excluded from the dominant AP
news service joint venture, could obtain news from other news services.
This did not mitigate the competition concerns. Nor was the fact that
readers could read the AP news stories in one local newspaper
determinative. A newspaper reflects the biases and views of its writers,
editors, and owners. One newspaper may downplay and truncate a news
wire story; the other newspaper may carry it as a headline. These are not
fungible commodities.
Thus, the media marketplace is not about
consumers switching from one homogeneous product to another. Rather, it
should be concerned with the net increase in consumer welfare from
having many competing and diverse news sources and editorial voices. As
Judge Hand stated about the marketplace of ideas, "it is only by cross' 73
lights from varying directions that full illumination can be secured."'
Unlike restraints on ordinary commodities (where consumers may turn to
less-desirable alternatives but the overall societal impact is insignificant),
for restraints in the media, the alternatives may be inherently
unsatisfactory
174
significant.
be
may
society
on
imposed
costs
and the
Finally, media markets are subject to their own particular economic
logic. Decisions by broadcasters about how to cover news, for example,
are affected by the number of viewers attracted to "hard" versus "soft"
news, the value advertisers place on reaching those viewers, what
competitors are75 doing, and the existence (or lack thereof) of public interest
requirements.1
V. SOME PROPOSALS FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

Given the importance of the marketplace of ideas to our democracy
and free-market economy, the importance of traditional media to the
marketplace of ideas, and the unique dangers of market failure in this
marketplace, it is unwise to continue the current ad hoc policies toward
media consolidation. We argue in this section why it is time for the
Obama administration to examine the way information flows in the
marketplace of ideas, the potential bottlenecks, and mechanisms to
promote competition in the marketplace of ideas. We recommend first a
substantive viewpoint diversity. Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media
Consolidation:An Empirical Study, 13-22 (Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Mar. 11,
2008),7available
at http://search.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=l 121229.
2
AP1, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
73
1

174

id.

See AP 11, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that "[a] free press is
indispensable to the workings of a democratic society").
175HAMILTON, supra note 124, at 13-15, 21-22.
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coherent media policy, second, an agenda for the agencies to look beyond a
merger's impact on advertising rates and more empirical work on media
mergers' impact on the marketplace of ideas, and finally ways the
government can promote access to the marketplace of ideas.
A. A Coherent Media Policy
Congress recently held a range of hearings on media-related topics,
including specific media mergers, the "digital future," net neutrality,
piracy, the role of private equity, as well as FCC oversight hearings.
Ideally, a national media policy would emerge from such hearings,
including media specific legislation and new ways to further the other
goals of any media policy, such as localism and diversity. It would be
useful, for example, for Congress to identify best practices relating to
media ownership and ways to promote minority ownership.
While some urge Congress for greater antitrust immunity for the
newspaper industry, the history and abuse of the Newspaper Preservation
Act caution against further relaxing the federal antitrust laws to permit
greater media consolidation.
Other countries, including Germany,
England, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, have taken steps to limit
concentration and promote editorial independence. 176 Some possibilities
discussed by Professor Baker and others include requiring more extensive
pre-merger review, applying presumptions against media mergers under
certain defined circumstances, barring certain types of transactions
entirely, explicitly taking editorial independence into account, giving
journalists a say or even a veto in merger decisions, imposing some non
content-based access requirements on dominant firms, and strengthening
antitrust enforcement through more objective criteria (e.g., presumption of
illegality based on market share). 177 To assist the newspaper industry,
some have proposed changes in federal 78tax and subsidy policies as an
alternative to broader antitrust immunity.
Today's ad hoc piece-meal policy work by each regulatory fiefdom is
inadequate. Congress needs to intercede, clearly define the policy goals,
176See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MEDIA MERGERS 50 (2003), available at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/3/17372985.pdf (discussing Germany's and England's approach to
media mergers); see also BAKER, supra note 17, at 181 (important economic subsidies to media entities
in the Netherlands and Norway are conditioned on journalists having complete editorial independence);
id. at 187 (Sweden provides special newspaper subsidies for secondary papers; papers lose the subsidy
if they obtain a certain level of market penetration).
177BAKER, supra note 17, at 164.

.78
See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, A Not-So-Radical Idea For Preserving Journalism's SocietyBuilding Role, SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
opinion/2008638058_opincl8baker.html (suggesting a federal tax credit to newspapers to cover up to
half the first $100,000 of the salary for each employed newspaper editor or journalist); Nichols &
McChesney, supra note 2 (proposing annual federal tax credit for all Americans on the first $200 they
spend on daily newspapers).
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and legislate media-specific competition laws. To accomplish this task,
Congress should establish a commission composed of diverse stakeholders
to examine further these issues on media ownership, conduct hearings, and
make recommendations, which Congress can implement. Notably, in the
last great depression of the 1930s, the congressional Temporary National
Economic Committee investigated the state of competition in various
industries. As the DOJ later reported, this empirical analysis was helpful.
The factual data from this effort exposed:
[T]he urgent need for a vigorous attack on monopoly power
and concentration of economic resources and gave added
impetus in 1938 and subsequently to the effort to reverse or
at least check the trend toward concentration which had
prevailed for most of the preceding half century, and to
overcome some of79the obstacles to effective enforcement of
the antitrust laws.
Nor should media policy be left exclusively to one federal agency's
domain. Each agency should have a defined role in preserving the
marketplace of ideas. The roles should be complementary, and further the
overall policy objectives. Today, apart from occasional consultations
about a particular transaction or new policy, the federal agencies tend to
operate in a vacuum. A telecommunications merger may not necessarily
violate the Clayton Act, but fail the FCC's ownership restrictions, or vice
versa. In essence, one does not necessarily follow from the other.' 80
B. Further Empirical Work on Media Mergers' Impact Beyond
Advertising Markets
For some media industries, the federal antitrust agencies examine only
the merger's likely impact on advertising rates 181 (and do not revisit the
179U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND
CURRENT PROBLEMS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, SUBMITTED TO THE U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMI-1EE

ON MONOPOLY 9 (May 23, 1952).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 350 n.18 (1959) (stating that
while the FCC may deny applications under its public interest standard where antitrust violations exist,
.'its approval of transactions which might involve Sherman Act violations is not a determination that
the Sherman Act has not been violated, and therefore cannot forestall the United States from
subsequently... challenging those transactions' (internal citation omitted)).
181See In the Matter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,748-49 (2003)
[hereinafter 2002 FCC Report] (holding that the only "economic" market in which broadcast stations
and newspapers compete is advertising, and thus the only relevant product market is advertising). In
the 2002 Biennial Review Order, the FCC defined advertising as the primary economic market in
which broadcast stations and newspapers derive their primary sources of revenue. Id. The FCC
concluded that for purchasers of advertising time, "newspapers, television, and radio are not good
substitutes and therefore make up distinct product markets." Id. at 13,749. The FCC in liberalizing its
media cross-ownership rules in 2008 continued to support the conclusion that the only relevant product
market is advertising and found "no reason to deviate from the defined product market." 2008 FCC
Report, supra note 54, at 2032-33 n.131. The FCC continues to believe that newspaper-broadcast
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market post-merger to determine if it predicted correctly).' 82 But reduced
price competition for advertising and programming is not the only (or even
primary) potential anticompetitive effect from a media merger. Indeed, if
the focus were solely advertising, one misses an important part of the
competitive landscape.
All media compete to varying degrees with other media for advertising
dollars. This is of particular importance in the newspaper, television, and
radio industries, where the competition extends beyond advertising prices.
National newspapers, such as The New York Times and The Wall Street
Journal, compete against other media for national advertisements; daily
newspapers compete against Craigslist for classified ads. By June 2006,
Google had forty-five percent of advertising revenue for search engines;
but when it comes to news, Google is primarily an aggregator with little
Likewise,
investment in the traditional newsgathering function.!83
Craigslist in some cities is a significant competitor for online classified
ads; but Craigslist has no traditional news gathering function. 84 Thus,
Google and Craigslist may be formidable competitors to the traditional
media for certain advertisers, but are not competitive threats for
newsgathering. This increase in advertising competition does not translate
into competition for better journalism (indeed, the reverse may be true as
many major newspapers are downsizing staff, reducing newshole, and
combinations "cannot adversely affect competition in any relevant product market." Id. (emphasis
added). This is nonsense. In reaching this position, the FCC relied on statements by media companies
Gannett and Hearst (who have an interest in the outcome of the FCC's rules) that "very little
advertising substitution exists between daily newspapers and broadcast outlets." 2002 FCC Report,
supra, at 13,749. The FCC ignored Gannett's and Hearst's contrary representations in their SEC filings
which emphasized the competition between newspapers and television. See GANNETT Co., INC.,
ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 8 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dl4D5a.
tl8Dk.htm ("[N]ewspapers and affiliated Web sites compete with other media for advertising
principally on the basis of their performance in helping to sell the advertisers' products or services and
their advertising rates. . . . Most of the company's newspapers compete with other newspapers
published in nearby cities and towns and with free-distribution and paid-advertising weeklies, as well
as other print and non-print media, including magazines, television, direct mail, cable television, radio,
outdoor advertising and Internet media."); HEARST ARGYLE TELEVISION INC., ANNUAL REPORT,

(FORM 10-K), at 12 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dVut2.tlsd.htm (explaining
that its "[b]roadcast television stations compete for advertising revenues with other broadcast television
stations, as well as with a variety of other media, such as newspapers, radio stations, magazines,
outdoor advertising, transit advertising, yellow page directories, direct mail, the Internet and MVPDs
serving the same market").
1
82See Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 147, at 575-79 (describing that antitrust
agencies fail to revisit industries post-merger to ensure that they accurately predicted the merger's
competitive impact).
1832007 PEJ Report, supra note 31. The 100 largest media companies (in terms of 2005
revenues) owned sixteen of the top twenty popular online news sites, as ranked by Nielsen/Net Ratings.
Id.
18 Started as a hobby by Craig Newmark in early 1995, Craigslist provides local classifieds and
forums for 570 cities worldwide. Craigslist Factsheet, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet.html
(last visited June 20, 2009). With more than twenty billion page views and more than fifty million
people using Craigslist each month, the Internet site publishes each month more than forty million new
classified ads and one million new job listings. Id.
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eliminating news bureaus). If advertising were the sole focus, the
traditional news media in a community could freely merge given
Craigslist, Google, and other vehicles for online advertising.
It is important to any media policy to consider media mergers' impact
on other policy objectives besides lower advertising rates. Media
consolidation may adversely affect, for example, nonprice editorial
competition, and non-economic policy considerations, such as localism and
diversity. It is well accepted, and a matter of everyday experience, that
price is not the sole measure of competition. Companies can, and often do,
compete on other dimensions, such as quality, service, and innovation.
Newspapers historically invested in editorial content to attract readers,
which in turn attracted advertisers.
The next issue is what mechanism should be implemented to promote
these values, and what should be antitrust's role? The DOJ historically and
recently has challenged anticompetitive restraints in the print media based
in part on its impact on the marketplace of ideas, specifically the loss of
editorial competition. 185 The DOJ is currently challenging the loss of the
editorial competition involving abuses of a newspaper joint operating
agreement. 86 In its complaint involving two leading West Virginia
newspapers, the United States alleged how local daily newspapers, such as
The Charleston Gazette and the Charleston Daily Mail, provide a unique
package of attributes for their readers, which other media cannot
substitute. 187 In challenging a market allocation scheme between the
nation's two largest alternative newsweekly publishers, the DOJ described
the competition between the defendants' alternative newsweeklies:
"' See, e.g., Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (W.D. Ark. 1995)
(evaluating newspaper merger's impact on both the readership and advertising markets), aff'd, 139 F.3d
1180 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Citizen Publ'g Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 985, 993-94 (D. Ariz.
1968) (holding that the quality of a newspaper is interrelated with circulation and advertising revenues
and that the "Operating Agreement" entered into between Citizen Publishing Company and Star
Publishing Company, which became effective on July 1, 1940, provided for price fixing, profit pooling,
and market allocations and were illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act), aff'd, 394 U.S. 131
(1969); United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 612 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (finding that
antitrust laws apply to newspapers' newsgathering and editorial competition), aff'd, 390 U.S. 712
(1968).
186Complaint at 1-2, United States v. Daily Gazette Co., 567 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D.W. Va. 2008)
(Civil Action No. 2:07-0329), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f223400/223469.htm.
181Id. at 11-12. The DOJ's complaint notes how newspapers provide national, state, and local
news in a timely manner and in a convenient, hardcopy format. Id. at 11. The news stories featured in
such newspapers are more detailed, when compared to the news reported by radio or television, and
they cover a wide range of topics of interest to local readers, not just major news highlights. Id.
Newspapers are portable and allow the reader to read the news, advertisements, and other information
at his or her own convenience. Readers also value other features of local daily newspapers, such as
calendars of local events, movie and TV listings, classified advertisements, commercial advertisements,
legal notices, comics, syndicated columns, and obituaries. Id. "Most readers of local daily newspapers
in the Charleston area do not consider weekly newspapers, radio news, television news, Internet news,
or any other media to be adequate substitutes for the two local daily newspapers serving the Charleston
area." Id. at 11-12.
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Readers and advertisers benefited with better editorial coverage, heavily
discounted advertising rates, and higher quality service.1 88 The FTC, under
to the marketplace of ideas in the merger
Chairman Pitofsky, was sensitive 89
between AOL and Time Warner.'
But for other media industries, such as radio and television, the federal
antitrust agencies examine the merger's impact only on advertising rates.
Considering a merger's impact on editorial competition for some media
and not others makes little sense.
But the larger issue is whether this is suitable for antitrust inquiry.
Some argue that the competition agencies should look beyond a media
merger's impact on advertising rates and services and consider its impact
on nonprice competition, which includes editorial competition' 9" and
choice.' 9' Others argue that editorial competition involves non-economic
concerns better left to other agencies, such as the FCC. Although the
federal courts have found that editorial competition among newspapers is
cognizable under the federal competition laws, 92 there remains the concern
that a particular administration may use editorial competition as a vehicle
to punish or support a media company, based on the company's views
toward the administration and its policies. 93 Despite these differences, we
188For example, in challenging the defendants' market allocation scheme, the United States
discussed the evidence of the intense editorial competition. Competitive Impact Statement at 6-7,
United States v. Village Voice Media, LLC, (N.D. Oh. 2003) (Civil Action No. 1:03CV0164),
The defendants' alternative
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2007OO/200715.htm.
newsweeklies responded to the other's editorial changes and improvements by introducing new or
better features or increasing investigative journalism to recapture the readers' attention to its
publication. Id. The different, and at times opposing, views and positions of the defendants'
competing alternative newsweeklies provided "readers with alternative viewpoints of important local
events affecting social, political, esthetic, and moral issues." Id. at 7.
189See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Approves AOL/Time Warner Merger with
Conditions (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/aol.htm (quoting Pitofsy as
saying "our concern was that the merger of these two powerful companies would deny to competitors
access to this amazing new broadband technology").
190
See Stucke & Grunes, supranote 14, at 270-73.
'9'
See, e.g., Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to
Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 206-207 (2007). For example, if the broadcast networks were
to combine their news operations, but each independently set its own advertising rates, the merger
might not be challenged if the marketplace of ideas were excluded from the analysis. Even though the
evening news would remain free, and the advertising rates would remain competitive, the nonprice
competition among the news networks would be eliminated. This is because the loss of this editorial
diversity could not be readily replaced.
192The more recent decisions are United States v. Daily Gazette Co., 567 F. Supp. 2d 859, 868
(S.D.W. Va. 2008); Reilly v. MediaNews Group, Inc., No. C 06-04332 SI, 2007 WL 1068202, at *3, 6
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2007) (holding that the alleged loss of editorial competition was sufficient for
antitrust injury). See also Hawaii v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1249-50 (D. Haw.
1999).
193
President Lyndon B. Johnson, for example, permitted a merger between two Houston banks in
exchange for favorable coverage in the Houston Chronicle. See MICHAEL R. BESCHLOSS, TAKING
CHARGE: THE JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE TAPES, 1963-1964, at 140-42, 151 (1997) (noting that LBJ said
he wanted a letter saying that the paper is going to support your administration as long as you're
there. Sincerely, your friend, [Chronicle president] John Jones.' . . . I don't see a damn thing wrong
with that... [B]oth Justice and Treasury will un-cock me right quick if I [approve the merger] ...
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do not advocate that the government agencies make normative judgments
about whether The Wall Street Journal would be a better newspaper in the
hands of the Murdochs, Grahams, or Sulzbergers.
Instead, one mechanism to promote a vibrant marketplace of ideas and
avoid these normative judgments may be in revising the structural
ownership requirements (such as FCC caps on ownership). In addition,
antitrust should have a role if direct evidence of market power exists. 94
Direct evidence of past anticompetitive restraints in that market, or natural
experiments in other geographic markets (e.g., evidence of anticompetitive
effects where one of the merging parties recently acquired its direct
competitor) should establish a prima facie violation under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
Another category of potential concern is the
transmission/content arena, when a company that dominates the
transmission of information seeks to enter the content side.' 95
[and] I ain't going to do it, George, unless John Jones is willing to say to me that he's my friend.").
After receiving the letter, the Administration cleared the bank merger.
President Nixon used the antitrust laws as a sword of Damocles against the media networks.
President Nixon in 1971 discussed intimidating the nation's three major television networks by keeping
the constant threat of an antitrust suit hanging over them. In a July 2, 1971, taped recorded discussion,
aide Charles W. Colson told Nixon that whether filing an antitrust case against ABC, NBC, and CBS
"is good or not is perhaps not the major political consideration. But keeping this case in a pending
status gives us one hell of a club on an economic issue that means a great deal to those three networks
...something of a sword of Damocles." Nixon responded, "Our gain is more important than the
economic gain. We don't give a goddam about the economic gain. Our game here is solely
political.... As far as screwing them is concerned, I'm very glad to do it." Walter Pincus & George
Lardner Jr., Nixon Hoped Antitrust Threat Would Sway Network Coverage, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1997,
at Al.
"If the threat of screwing them is going to help us more with their programming than doing it,
then keep the threat," said Nixon. "Don't screw them now. [Otherwise] they'll figure that we're done."
Id. As for the antitrust actions, the White House kept the DOJ from filing suit until April 1972, when
the government accused the networks of restraining trade and monopolizing prime-time entertainment
with their own programs. The suits were dismissed without prejudice in 1974. BERNARD M.
HOLLANDER, ORAL HISTORY: FIFTY-EIGHT YEARS INTHE ANTITRUST DIvISION: 1949-2007, at 174-79

(June 2008). The Ford administration renewed the complaints and subsequent consent decrees
curtailed prime-time productions by the networks. Pincus & Lardner, supra.
'94
See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 14, at 299-300.
'5g
This was the situation in the AT&T case. See United States v. AT&T Co. 552 F. Supp. 131,
223-24 (D.D.C. 1982). And it may arise in a merger between a major cable operator and movie studio
(the anticompetitive effects of which prompted in part the 1992 Cable Act). Congress found, in
enacting the 1992 Cable Act, that a cable operator has an incentive to favor its affiliated programmers.
But a cable operator also has an incentive to offer an attractive package of programs to its subscribers.
When these two incentives are in conflict, "the operator may, as a rational profit-maximizer,
compromise the consumers' interests." Time Warner Entm't Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1322
(D.C. Cir. 2000). This scenario arose in a consent decree involving Time Warner's acquisition of
Turner Broadcasting System. In the Matter of Time Warner Inc., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. et al., Dkt.
No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997), available at http://www.fte.gov/os/1997/02/c3709.do.pdf. The FTC
believed that its enforcement action was wholly consistent with the goals of Congress in enacting the
1992 Cable Act in providing greater access to programming and promoting competition in local cable
markets. Statement of Chairman Pitofsky and Commissioners Steiger and Varney in Time Warner Inc.,
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. et al., Dkt. No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/1997/02/c3709other.htm. One of the consent decree provisions required Time Warner to place a
rival to its newly acquired CNN on certain of its cable systems. The FTC responded that this narrowly
drawn provision was designed to restore the incentives Time Warner would otherwise have had to carry
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C. PromotingAccess to the Marketplace of Ideas
Given traditional media's high fixed costs and significant entry
barriers, 196 concentrated media ownership can hinder competition. The
Obama administration should affirmatively examine how information
flows in the marketplace of ideas, and what remedial steps can remove any
bottlenecks.
The Supreme Court of late has displayed great faith in regulation to
diminish the likelihood of and remedy anticompetitive harm.' 97 It would
be a mistake, however, to believe that regulatory dictates alone could
replicate a competitive marketplace of ideas. In addition to the risks of
imperfect information and regulatory capture, government regulators,
unlike private actors (who, at times, bear the costs of their mistakes), may
undertake anticompetitive actions because of weaker incentives to avoid
mistakes, political myopia, and the lack of direct accountability to the
public.198 As Alfred Kahn stated, the "essential task of public policy in a
rivals to CNN but for the fact of this acquisition. The FTC believed that Time Warner's acquisition of
CNN, as alleged in the complaint, gave it both the ability and incentive to make entry of competing
news services more difficult, by denying them access to its extensive distribution system. In the Matter
of Time Warner Inc., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., Tele-Communications, Inc., and Liberty
Media Corp., Dkt. No. C-3709, Complaint 38 (Feb. 7, 1997). The FTC observed that courts have
upheld against First Amendment challenge regulations specifically designed to address competitive
concerns arising from vertically-integrated cable companies' monopoly control over distribution. What
is also interesting is that the FTC abstained from determining which rival to CNN must be carried on
the cable network:
In this case, there is even greater reason to avoid a more intrusive role, since
programming content would be unavoidably implicated-the selection of one
competitor over another inevitably determines to some degree the content of the new
entry. In addition, excessive involvement in the selection process could conflict
with the goal that the antitrust laws, and antitrust remedies, are intended to protect
competition, not competitors.
Statement of Chairman Pitofsky, supra. A similar concern arose in the AOL/Time Warner merger,
prompting restrictions against AOL Time Warner from discriminating on the basis of corporate
affiliation in the transmission of content. See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public
Comment, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aolanalysis.pdf; see also FTC Backs AOL-Time Warner
Merger, J. RECORD, Dec. 15, 2000 (quoting Chairman Robert Pitofsky) ("Our concern here was with
access, that these two powerful companies would create barriers that would injure competitors .... );
AOL Merger Clears Last Big Hurdle, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2000, at Al (quoting Commissioner
Leary) ("I had and I continue to have concerns about these content issues ....
").
196Television, cable, and radio have regulatory barriers and high fixed costs. Newspapers have
high fixed "first copy" costs. Publishing the first copy of a newspaper is high, given the reporting and
editorial costs, the infrastructure to print newspapers, and costs to solicit advertisers. The marginal cost
of producing the second, third, and fourth copies is very low and remains low up to the newspaper's
printing capacity. See WORLD BANK, supranote 83, at 183.
19"
Verizon Commc'n Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004).
19 Frangois Moreau, The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
847, 850 (2004). For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's merger review policies
were criticized for relying on data supplied by the regulated entities, rather than conducting its own
independent fact gathering and analysis of market definition. Sara Stefanini, Think Tank Urges FERC
to Reform Merger Policies, COMPETIIoN L. 360, Mar. 15, 2007, available at
http://competition.law360.com/SecureNiewArticle.aspx?id=20553; see also Comments of Diana Moss
at FERC Technical Conference on Electricity Merger Policy (Mar. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/FERCcomments.ashx.
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free enterprise system should be to preserve the framework of a fair field
and no favors, letting the results take care of themselves."' 99 Similarly, to
prevent the formation of monopolies, the United States historically focused
on maintaining competitive market structures, rather than regulatory
dictates. °°
Thus, the best remedy for media monopolies is to prevent their
formation, through (i) structural mechanisms (such as cross-ownership
restrictions and caps on ownership both nationally and in local markets);
(ii) removal of bottlenecks and any government-imposed entry barriers;
and (iii) active and informed antitrust enforcement to enjoin
anticompetitive media mergers. The Obama administration, for example,
should be vigilant of any onerous government regulations that reduce the
media's independence or distort the provision of information. This means
keeping the media 20independent and free from governmental control or
improper influence. '
The Obama administration should also examine mechanisms to foster
the free flow of information. Under an evolutionary economic perspective,
not only is experimentation critical, but also the dissemination of
information of that experimentation and feedback thereto.20 2 Division of
labor has increased specialization of knowledge, whereby individuals
know much about a limited area. This specialization of knowledge can
increase transaction costs (i.e., ascertaining the measurement and
'99Alfred E. Kahn, Standardsfor AntitrustPolicy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 28, 39 (1953).
Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: The Matter of Remedies, 91
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GEO. L.J. 169, 178-79 (2002) (noting that FTC enforcement efforts during the 1990s were directed
toward preserving open access to markets). Thus, Section 1 focuses on concerted activity to eliminate
competitors, and raise entry barriers. Section 7 prevents mergers that tend to create a monopoly.
Attempts to monopolize violate Section 2. See Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute
Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 546 n.254 (2009). The 1996 Act was deregulatory in its
approach, continuing the shift of the telecommunications industry away from a heavily regulated
industry (with behavioral restrictions) to the aspired open competition (with structural restrictions).
Congress's intent, as expressed by the 1996 Act, is that the antitrust analysis should be primarily
conducted by the federal antitrust agencies and not by the FCC. While the FCC's "public interest"
standard and ownership control regulations touch upon antitrust issues, Congress wanted the DOJ and
the FTC independently and carefully to review media mergers and their impact on competition in the
marketplace of ideas. The legislative history of the savings clause to the 1996 Act shows that the FCC
regulatory scheme does not preempt antitrust review of media mergers generally, and the marketplace
of ideas specifically. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 14, at 288-94. However, aside from political and
ideological concerns about lax or zealous antitrust enforcement, conventional antitrust policy is not
easy to apply in media markets. See Howard Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass-MediaRegulation: Can
Merger StandardsProtect the Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371, 373 (2006).
201The World Bank noted that "[h]igher levels of perceived media freedom or independence are
associated with lower levels of perceived corruption, regardless of differences in a country's level of
income."
202 WORLD BANK, supra note 83, at 182.
See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 402 (1982); see also Moreau, supra note 198, at 869. A positive feedback loop for example
may emerge from the learning effects from diffused technologies. For example, as end-users
experiment and alter a particular technology, the suppliers learn from this diffusion. In the next round,
the suppliers, in turn, can offer this greater diffusion of offerings, which various users can further
modify.
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performance characteristics of goods and services outside one's area of
expertise).0 3 Moreover, the dispersion of information in society and the
attendant search costs can inhibit our understanding of the sources of poor
economic performance and thwart dynamic efficiency. This is precisely
where the government can play a key role in further "integrating the
dispersed knowledge essential to efficient production in a world of
specialization. ' 2 4 In facilitating "the greatest possible centralization of
information, and diffusion of it from the centre, 20 5 the government can
more cheaply inform market participants. This does not mean having the
government evaluate or filter the information's content. Instead, the
government can evaluate what additional steps to promote the free flow of
information and reduce search costs. 20 6 These steps may include creating
antitrust safe harbors for private individuals to (i) publicly disseminate
price, wage, and other information,0 7 or (ii) promote novel forms of
information dissemination, such as prediction markets, whereby
individuals bet on future outcomes. 208 To foster accountability-and lower
the media's search costs-the government can also promote its own
209
transparency and remove restraints in accessing such information.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 73 (2005).
4 Id. at 164.
205 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 123 (2003).
203

20

206For

example, the government can promote benchmarks so that consumers can readily compare

prices of goods, such as retail fuel prices, mattresses, and cell phone services. In markets with many
sellers, buyers may have high search costs to identify the lowest-priced seller. Increased price
transparency may make it easier for buyers to compare prices and bargain shop, reducing their search
costs. Retail fuel prices can be moderately affected if websites publish the comparative prices at local
pumps on a timely basis, and government should be vigilant against any private restraints to inhibit this
transparency; and in locations where private resources do not make this information available, local
governments might well step in.
207Making historical price, supply, or cost data may also enable each competitor to benchmark its
performance to an industry standard. Some steps to mitigate the antitrust risks for such exchanges
include: (1) having a third party, e.g., a purchaser, government agency, consultant, academic institution,
or trade association, collect the data; (2) basing the information provided by the participants on data
more than three months old; (3) having at least five providers report data upon which each
disseminated statistic is based, with no individual provider's data representing more than twenty-five
percent on a weighted basis of that statistic; and (4) aggregating any information disseminated such that
it would not allow recipients to identify the prices charged or compensation paid by any particular
provider. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 63 (1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/0000.pdf; see also Letter from R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Div., to Diana West, Internationally Board-Certified Lactation Consultants (May 25,
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/203831.pdf (explaining that the
Division would not challenge the collection of fee information for a survey among competitors, which
would be collected following the principles outlined in the Health Care Guidelines). For a further
discussion of the antitrust risks of the dissemination of price information, see generally Maurice E.
Stucke, Evaluating the Risks of IncreasedPrice Transparency,19 ANTITRUST 81 (2005).
208
See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Statement on Prediction Markets, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR.
REGULATORY STUDIES 2 (2007), availableat http://wwm.com/abstract=984584.
209The Freedom of Information Act, for example, was enacted to foster this transparency. 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2000). For a critique of its success and shortcomings in recent years, see generally
ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2006).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Although some may argue that the current recession deserves far
greater attention than a coherent media policy, this is short-sighted. A
vibrant marketplace of ideas is too important to our democracy. The media
can inform the electorate, serve as a watchdog on corporate and political
organizations, enhance market efficiency, and advance the discourse of
public policy. One cannot rely on flawed laissez-faire beliefs that
unregulated market forces will provide the efficient level of information.
Nor can one assume that the current haphazard patchwork of media
policies will remedy the current ailments in the media industry today or
promote the unrestrained flow of information.
Instead, the Obama administration must undertake a more empirical
analysis of how media markets work, and ensure that any competition
policy toward media mergers be in furtherance of, and driven by, a national
media policy, as set by Congress. Sole reliance on enforcement by the
FCC or federal antitrust agencies has proven to be too ad hoc, too
haphazard, and not particularly effective. Aside from political and
ideological concerns about lax or zealous antitrust enforcement,
conventional antitrust policy is not easy to apply in media markets, and a
combination of new legislation and more informed antitrust enforcement is
necessary to: (i) promote, or at least not diminish, the media's contribution
to the marketplace of ideas; (ii) have antitrust merger policies complement
FCC policy, which together should provide some of the necessary legal
framework for a vibrant marketplace of ideas; and (iii) understand from a
twenty-first century perspective, all of the values, including noneconomic
values, such as localism and diversity, that are important to preserving a
healthy marketplace of ideas.

